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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an evaluation of the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS) to
determine whether it is likely to solve a host of long-standing problems with use of
automatic test equipment (ATE) for support of Naval aircraft. CASS is a new ATE
program nearing the end of full scale development which will replace all current ATE
systems and many smaller manual testers to form a single, general purpose test system for
all intermediate level and some depot level avionic testing. It is intended ultimately to be
the Navy standard test system for all NAVAIR and NAVSEA requirements. The study
involves an overview of the environment in which ATE is used, a history of ATE problems
and development leading up to inception of the CASS program, a detailed description of
the program itself, a description of the repair process using ATE, and an evaluation of the
CASS program. Its conclusions are that CASS is technically capable of solving or
alleviating virtually every significant problem affecting use of existing ATE systems, lead
to large savings in weapon system support costs, and improve readiness during surges in
operating tempo. Its success is very vulnerable, however, to decisions made during
introduction planning. Such decisions include funding cuts which cause the schedule t
o slip or reduce CASS system testing performance and maintainability, and inaccurate a
nalysis of CASS hardware requirements to support the intended testing load at each site.
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Computerized Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) is a critical element of logistic
support of Naval aircraft. It is also costly. Over $10 billion must be spent over the next
20 years to replace obsolete ATE systems and acquire testing capabilities for weapon
systems now nearing fleet introduction. [Ref. l:p. 1.3]
ATE is used to perform intermediate and depot level electronic testing of aviation
electronic components and circuit boards. It has been increasingly relied upon since the
first major ATE system, known as the Versatile Avionics Shop Tester (VAST), was
introduced to the fleet in 1972. Today, intermediate maintenance shops aboard carriers
operate as many as 24 types of ATE systems plus over 300 manual electronic testers to
support the diverse testing requirements of modem weapon systems. [Ref. l:p. 3-2]
Unfortunately, these many different automatic and manual testers have a very low
level of equipment standardization, which has created serious supportability problems.
To operate and maintain them, an average ship must carry over 30,000 line items of spare
parts, 624 technical manuals, 250 technicians, and dedicate 15,000 square feet of space.
[Ref. 2] The complexity of ATE logistic support is a critical concern not only
because of its high cost, but because ATE supportability is closely related to aircraft
availability and stockage requirements for avionic system spares.
The Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS) is a new ATE system
developed to replace all existing ATE systems and many manual testers used in
intermediate maintenance. CASS will serve as the Navy standard test system through the
early twenty-first century. Nearing the end of full scale development by General Electric,
CASS will begin operational test and evaluation in mid-1990, with initial deliveries
beginning in 1992. Fleet introduction should begin in 1994. CASS attempts to solve the
supportability problems of existing ATE systems through:
* Improved testing throughput capability using advanced technology and testing
concepts.
* Improved reliability, maintainability and standardization of hardware and software.
* Improved ability to be upgraded and reconfigured to satisfy changing testing
requirements.
* Reduced life cycle costs.
* Improved support system stability because CASS will be a single test system
serving both present and future testing needs. This will enable future weapon
systems to be designed for testability starting at program initiation and reduce
dependence on aircraft contractors to provide peculiar support equipment and
interim support.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate CASS to determine whether it is likely to
solve the host of long-standing problems with use of automatic test equipment for support
of Naval aircraft.
The primary research question is:
What are the critical problems plaguing the current family of testers (FOT), and to
what extent is the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) solving these problems in the
acquisition and fielding of the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS)?
Relevant subsidiary research questions are:
" What is the history of the acquisition of ATE in Naval Air? What were the
contrasting weapon system support philosophies and acquisition strategies for the
FOT and CASS?
" What is the impact of ATE supportability deficiencies on weapon system support
and cost of spares?
C. METHODOLOGY
Research began with a review of articles, Navy documents and data relating to two
areas. First, general ATE issues were examined, including evolution, problems, and the
relationships between ATE supportability, performance and weapon system spares
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requirements. Second, specific CASS program issues were examined, including its goals,
acquisition history, attributes and introduction plan.
Visits were also made to various sites to attend the ATE Cognizant Field Activity
(CFA) Review, CASS Program Review and CASS Logistic Support Analysis (LSA)
Review.
Finally, personal and telephone interviews were conducted with representatives of
the NAVAIR CASS Program Office and introduction team, CASS introduction team
members at the Naval Air Engineering Center and Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville,
various NAVAIR and type commander ATE managers, and fleet ATE production
personnel at NAS Norfolk and aboard USS America.
D. THESIS CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter II begins with an introduction to the role and environment of ATE in
avionics repair. It then traces the evolution of ATE systems and problems leading up to
the present family of testers and to CASS. Chapter m describes the CASS program in
detail, including its goals, current status, acquisition history, system architecture, and
introduction plan. Chapter IV describes the intermediate level repair process using ATE,
to lay the foundation for analyzing the performance and supportability of the FOT and
CASS. Chapter V compares CASS with the FOT. Finally, Chapter VI presents a
summary of the research, conclusions and recommendations.
H. ATE OVERVIEW
This chapter is an introduction to the environment, function and evolution of ATE
systems in support of Naval aviation. It begins with a description of automated test
equipment within the context of the avionics maintenance environment: the maintenance
concept, levels of repair, ATE facilities, and ATE system architecture. The chapter then
reviews the development of ATE systems, requirements, problems and change initiatives
that led up to CASS.
A. ATE SYSTEM ROLE AND ENVIRONMENT
1. ATE in the Avionics Maintenance Concept
The maintenance concept for a weapon system describes its overall system
support environment. It includes descriptions of maintenance levels, repair policies,
effectiveness factors and logistic support requirements such as test equipment, facilities,
manpower and training, and supply support. Because ATE is an integral part of the
maintenance concept of many of the avionics systems presently in the fleet and most of
the systems being developed, ATE critically influences weapon system design and the
other logistic elements needed to support it throughout its life cycle.
Figure 1 illustrates the place of automatic test equipment in the global
classification of test equipment. [Ref. 3:p. 1.2] As this taxonomy shows,
test equipment is a specific catagory of support equipment that is formally termed test,
measurement, and diagnostic equipriient (TMDE). It includes manual electronic test
equpment (ETE), automatic test equipment (ATE), test program sets (TPS) and calibration
equipment (reference and transfer standards). Each of these four catagories of test
equipment can be further subdivided as shown in the figure. ATE is defined as:
Aviation Support Equipment that is capable, under program control, of
automatically generating and independently furnishing programmed stimuli,
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tested and making a comparison to accept or reject the measured values in
accordance with predetermined limits.. .Included in this definition are ATE self-test
and self-check test program sets (TPSs) and weapon system or equipment
application TPSs. [Ref. 4]
The diversity and complexity of aircraft weapon systems in today's Navy make
automated testing an essential element of their support, especially aboard carriers.
Intermediate level maintenance shops must possess a broad and flexible electronic support
capability; shipboard ATE systems typically test 650 diverse 'black boxes' and 2580
subcomponents, most with very low failure rates. [Ref. l:p. 6-2] To do so manually
would be a monumental task in terms of the required troubleshooting time, training,
manpower and technical publications. Automation has demonstrated its ability to reduce
test times by as much as 30% over manual testing [Ref. 5:p. 63], and meet
the fundamental constraints posed by a carrier's limited space, manpower, and off-ship
logistics pipeline. For these reasons, ATE is a mainstay of the Navy's organic
maintenance support concept for avionics.
2. Level of Repair
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) is a six volume instruction
that sets CNO policy for aircraft maintenance. [Ref. 6] It defines three levels of
maintenance:
* Organizational: Squadron level on-equipment maintenance functions such as
aircraft inspecting, servicing, trouble shooting and replacing parts at the Weapons
Replaceable Assembly (WRA) level. Avionics WRA's are the 'black boxes,'
packaged functionally and for ease of removal and replacement.
* Intermediate: Support organizations that perform off-equipment functions such as
calibration, limited manufacturing, and repair down to the WRA level and limited
repair of avionics Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRA) such as circuit boards. ATE
is employed extensively at this level for fault isolation of avionic WRAs and SRAs.
An Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) avionics division is
typically co-located at sea or ashore with the squadrons it supports and consists of
200-400 Navy technicians.
* Depot: Support organizations that perform both on and off-equipment functions
such as overhaul, modifications, calibration, manufacturing, repair and
condemnation of end items, including aircraft, WRAs and SRAs, to a greater depth
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than is performed at the 0 or I level. The same ATE as is used at the I level
performs much of the avionics repair, although it is often augmented with more
capable test equipment. They are not co-located with squadrons/AIMDs, have
extensive facilities, and typically employ several thousand civilian technicians.
NAMP policy dictates that maintenance will be performed at the level "which
will ensure optimum economic use of resources, consistent with assigned readiness and
availability standards." [Ref. 6:p. 8-7] This level is determined by Level of Repair
Analysis (LORA), the operational need for quick turn-around of aircraft, and the physical,
manning and training constraints of 0 and I level facilities. These considerations drive
the relative capabilities of ATE systems developed for each level. Most avionics WRAs
are removed and replaced at the 0 level, tested and repaired at the I level, and their SRAs
are tested and repaired at either the I or D level.
Organizational level testing capability significantly influences I and D level
ATE requirements. Using either 'suitcase' testers or Built in Test Equipment (BITE)
designed into the WRA, extensive fault isolation may be performed by the flight crew or
O level maintenance technicians without removing WRAs from the aircraft. This may
reduce unnecessary component removals and aircraft down time. Such Built in Test
(BIT) capability may also be integrated with I and D level ATE test strategies. If
circuitry for self test is contained within the failed component, the ATE system may
monitor it to speed fault isolation and to reduce hardware and software requirements of
the ATE. Such integration is achieved in newer tester/weapon system mixes such as the
Intermediate-level Avionics Fault Tree Analyzer (IAFTA) for the F-18. Through such a
BIT/BITE strategy, the Navy seeks to reduce and ultimately eliminate I level ATE
altogether and adopt a two-level maintenance concept for avionics. Under this concept,
O level technicians will isolate faults down to the SRA (circuit card) level, which will
then be repaired using ATE at the depot. Weapon system components will be packaged
differently than they are today to facilitate quick removal and replacement of circuit cards,
perhaps by replacing the current WRA packaging concept with banks of SRAs accessible
simply by removing an aircraft panel. This '0 to D' concept will be more technically
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feasible and justified (based on life cycle cost analysis) as advances continue in weapon
system reliability, BIT design, manufacturing and packaging. [Ref. 7]
3. Facilities
ATE must perform in three types of I level maintenance facilities: forward
deployed Mobile Maintenance Facilities (8x8x20 foot vans) powered by portable
generators; permanent shore sites (of which there are 46, though many of the smaller ones
currently have no ATE); and ships. Aircraft carriers are by far the largest users of
forward deployed ATE, although there is a growing requirement for support of aircraft
such as the H-60 and V-22 using ATE installed in vans and aboard amphibious ships.
There is no standard facility layout or standard ATE requirement list for each
type of AIMD activity. Each shore NAS specializes in the support of a few types of
aircraft such as fighter, attack, ASW, or helicopter, and no two facilities are alike. While
aircraft carriers have far more commonality, they nevertheless vary in their complement
of aircraft because of differing deckloads. For example, many older ships cannot support
F-14s, so several combinations of F-18s and A-6s have been used to meet mission
requirements. The result is that every sea and shore-based I level ATE suite must be
tailored to the systems it supports and undergoes constant change as aircraft and their
weapon systems are phased in and out.
The carrier ATE shop is a difficult physical environment for electronic systems
such as ATE that operate at high power and generate heat. ATE is used in close quarters
and faces extremes in shock, input power transients, and unreliable air conditioning
systems. ATE must perform and be supportable despite the inherent stresses of this
operating environment.
4. ATE Architecture
Architecture refers to the packaging of the required set of functional
components of the ATE system. Functions may be combined in one package, as in a
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suitcase tester, or they may be modular instruments and interface devices, as in large
semi-permanently mounted ATE systems.
Every ATE system shares a common set of basic functional components. It
must have a:
" Control processor: A computer and software;
• Operator interface device: A CRT and keyboard;
" Power distribution system;
* Suite of instrumentation assets: Devices to stimulate and measure the response of
the unit under test (UUT);
• Interconnection Device (ID): The electronic and mechanical interface between the
ATE station and the UUT.
The ID is often a large, heavy, electronic device set on a cart. It contains
active circuitry plus interface hookups such as wiring harnesses. It may also be a passive
device that is little more than an electrical junction box and cables.
In general purpose ATE systems, the ID is one functional unit in the complete
Test Program Set (TPS). The TPS contains everything needed to adapt a particular UUT
to an ATE station and perform a test, including:
• Test Program (TP): Application software containing the test instructions for
component stimulation and output measurement. It may be stored on tape (as in
VAST) or hard disk (single or stacked) and is installed or called up to run the
desired test.
* Test Program Instruction (TPI): A paper or software description of the operating
procedures to connect the station, UUT, ID and other devices that may be required,
such as portable power supplies, and initiate and execute the test.
0 Supplementary Data: Also known as engineering support data (ESD), they may
include test strategies, signal interfaces, functional block diagrams and diagnostic
flow charts of the UUT and TPS that may be needed to complete a test.
Figure 2 illustrates these TPS components, showing a CASS station in the
background. [Ref. 8] Because every WRA and SRA tested on ATE has a unique












Figure 2. Test Program Set Components.
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B. EVOLUTION OF ATE
This section highlights the evolution of ATE support of Naval aircraft, with
particular emphasis on the problems and change initiatives that led to development of
CASS. These problems and initiatives are not merely of historical interest, but are also
relevant to the current state of automatic testing because every generation of ATE is still
in the fleet.
1. Peculiar Support Equipment
Prior to the introduction of common (or general purpose) ATE systems in the
early 1970s, the Navy supported its avionic testing needs using manual peculiar support
equipment (PSE), each type designed for testing a single avionic system. The rapid
growth in diversity and complexity of weapon systems, however, made deployment of
system-specific PSE an unworkable concept for supporting an entire aircraft or carrier air
wing, for the reasons discussed below.
PSE testers have many advantages over general purpose testers; this accounts
for their continued importance in our support equipment inventory. Acquisition of PSE
rather than common ATE minimizes technical, schedule and cost risks because the avionic
support is generally developed in small packages to support each sub-system by the
weapon system contractor. This approach optimizes cost effectiveness at the subsystem
level because PSE can be developed quickly and cheaply and can be tailored to provide
the exact testing capability needed with no frills.
At the aircraft or carrier air wing levels, however, use of PSE developed by
the weapon system contractor is a case study in sub-optimization. It results in
proliferation of different types of test equipment, very high life cycle costs for the weapon
and support systems, high demands for manpower and facility space, short test equipment
obsolescence cycles, redundant development costs, little competition in development and
production, and limited flexibility to support increased testing needs during a surge in
operating tempo. Optimization of test equipment at the sub-system level comes at a high
11
price when viewed from this perspective, making acquisition of general purpose ATE a
more cost effective alternative. [Ref. 91
2. VAST
The Versatile Avionics Shop Tester (VAST) was a new way of doing business.
It was the first general purpose ATE aboard carriers, the product of a concept adopted by
NAVAIR in the mid-60s with the goals of reducing weapon system support costs and
supportability problems inherent in reliance on the growing collection of PSE.
The first production contract for the Versatile Avionics Shop Tester was
awarded in 1968, and VAST stations were first installed aboard carriers and at shore I
level and D level sites in 1972. The 95 stations bought were phased in between 1972 and
1978 at a total production cost of $1 billion, plus at least another billion for TPS. [Ref.
3:p. 5-111 The largest ATE ever developed for DOD, VAST consists of 10 bays of
hardware.
VAST was designed to support the new 'Grumman Air Wing' of F-14, E-2 and
S-3 aircraft, including over 150 WRAs and several thousand SRAs. It was itself initially
supported both technically and logistically by the contractors (Harris for the station and
Grumman for TPS). VAST was expected eventually to support the testing and calibration
of its own components. Each carrier was to have three identical stations, with as many
as five stations going to some large shore AIMDs. [Ref. 10]
Within the first two years of its introduction, however, concern arose over
VAST's ability to support the existing and emerging testing workload. Because VAST
had an unexpectedly low throughput and required TPSs that were both expensive and time
consuming to develop, many test requirements initially scheduled for VAST support were
offloaded to manual PSE testers that were already developed. New general purpose ATE
systems were also developed, so that by 1976 VAST had been augmented by the
Electronic Module Test Console (EMTC), Digital Module Test Console (DMTC), Central
Air Data Computer (CADC), Automatic Test Set (ATS), Display Automatic Test Set
(DATS), Hybrid Automatic Test System (HATS), and CAT lID/CAT HID digital SRA
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testers. [Ref. 5:p. 16] A 'Tailored VAST' was also created by reconfiguring along
functional lines to test only digital SRAs. Even with all these additional testers, a fourth
VAST was soon added to carriers to satisfy workload requirements.
[Ref. 10:p. 4.5] Figure 3 shows this complex mix of testers required by a typical
shipboard AIMD. [Ref. 5:p. 17]
Despite its development as a 'universal tester' for the S-3, E-2 and F-14, by
1976 VAST actually supported 87% of the WRAs and 27% of the SRAs for these
aircraft, and other ATE and PSE supported the remainder. These smaller ATE and PSE
systems also supported the remaining carrier deckload, including the A-6E, EA-6B, KA-
6D, A-7B, SH-3D and C-2A aircraft. [Ref. 5:p. 17]
Part of VAST's difficulty in supporting the full load of WRAs and SRAs was
that the VAST station itself was difficult to support. The system was complex both
technically and logistically, and was supported largely by the contractor. It was soon
observed that whenever the VAST stations were down aboard carriers, within a few days
the readiness measures of all three weapon systems decreased.
VAST demonstrated the impracticality of using a single, general-purpose tester
to support such a wide spectrum of functions and large testing workload given the
technology of the time. It did, however, validate the concept and feasibility of
standardized testing. It also taught a major lesson about support of support equipment:
there is a direct, dependent relationship between ATE availability and aircraft readiness.
[Ref. 11]
3. The Marcy Report
In response to widespread problems reported by the fleet with VAST and other
test equipment, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development (Mr.
Marcy) in 1975 requested a quick study of problems and solutions. An ad hoc committee
was created, composed of representatives from the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT),
the Systems Commands, their field activities, the fleet and industry consultants. [Ref. 5:p.
2] Their 1976 study, known as the Marcy Report, charted a new course in the way the
13
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Navy acquired and managed ATE systems, one which will continue to guide
decisionmakers into the next century.
The ad hoc committee explored the entire spectrum of problems plaguing
electronic test equipment, including hardware, software, TPS, acquisition, integrated
logistic support (ILS) management, and the Navy actions required to solve them. They
concluded that the Navy had not done a good job in acquiring, deploying and utilizing
its ATE for reasons deeply ingrained in the way the Navy did business. Chief among
these was the lack of emphasis on 'front-end' spending during the initial phases of
weapon system and ATE design. Too often systems were developed to minimize the
initial procurement costs even when higher levels of spending at this stage (for reliability
improvements, for example) would result in lower total life cycle costs and fewer
downstream logistics problems. [Ref. 5:p. 68]
Figure 4 summarizes the report's findings in a problem/solution matrix. [Ref.
5:p. 6] These 20 problems and 14 solutions show the complex and often overlapping
technical and management issues the ad hoc commitee determined must be addressed to
improve ATE operation and supportability in the fleet. The report's recommendations
included the following: [Ref. 3:p. 5-12]
" Enforce existing Navy policy in weapon system acquisition to ensure their
supportability.
* Educate management personnel in the technical and management issues involved
in weapon system acquisition, including the practical problems of BIT and off-line
ATE hardware/software.
* Provide quick relief to the fleet by (1) initiating engineering changes to improve the
reliability of high-failure rate items of prime equipment as well as ATE, (2)
establishing "tiger teams" to respond to ATE problems, (3) developing organic test
programming capabilities, and (4) prohibiting deployment of ATE without prior
approval from NAVMAT.
" Develop a new family of general-purpose ATE.
* Initiate and support both a short-range and long-term research and development
program in automatic testing technology under supervision of a central NAVMAT
ATE management office.
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Figure 4. Marcy Report Problem/Solution Matrix.
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The last two recommendations formed the core of NAVAIR's ATE
development plans for the 1980s and resulted ultimately in the CASS program.
4. The NAVAIR ATE Program Plan
NAVAIR began formulating plans for the 1980s and beyond by assessing the
recommendations of the Marcy report, two subsequent iTE projects involving many
DOD and industry participants, and the experiences of the previous decade of ATE
support. The resulting plans were documented in the 1979 NAVAIR ATE Program Plan
which focused on achieving seven primary goals: [Ref. 3:p. 5-16]
• Integrate ATE program management
* Improve ATE acquisition
" Design avionics for testability and maintainability
* Minimize the variety of ATE
" Consolidate and improve ATE software
* Improve the quality of test program sets
" Attain full and timely organic capability
The ATE Program Plan as o lesponded to tasking from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to develop plans to standardize weapon and support systems,
improve weapon system support and readiness, and implement sequential system upgrades
through Pre-Planned Product Improvement (p3I) efforts. [Ref. 12:p. 7]
NAVAIR regarded standardizing ATE aboard carriers as the central objective
of this plan, because standardization encompasses and integrates many of the other
program goals. To achieve this objective, the plan established a short range goal and a
long range goal. These were, first, to create a functional family of common ATE to serve
through the 1980s and next, to defire and acquire a Consolidated Support System (CSS)
as CASS was first called, to serve into the next century. [Ref. 1 :p. 2-2]
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5. The Short Range Goal: A Functional Family of Testers
To achieve an immediate reduction in proliferation, NAVAIR sought to
identify a group of existing testers most able to accept general purpose testing functions
to support a broadened range of weapon system types. These testers would form a
functional family of testers (FOT). Program managers would be required to give
preference to one of these testers in planning support for new weapon systems. However,
establishing a preferred family of testers was slow. It took until 1981 to standardize the
ATE selection process and until 1982 to publish a preferred ATE list. [Ref. 3:p. 5-15]
Many of the 24 general purpose ATE systems and hundreds of PSE types now
in the fleet were developed after the decision to standardize because it is difficult to
enforce exclusive use of FOT members given the cost and schedule pressures of weapon
system acquisition and the advantages of procuring PSE support, such as low up-front
costs and rapid development and fielding.
The 24 ATE systems are classified by the functions of the weapon systems
they support, because these functions dictate the test requirements and instrumentation of
the ATE. Functional classes are shown in Figure 5: [Ref. 1]
WRA Support SRA Support
* General avionics * Digital




Figure 5. ATE Functional Classifications.
The current preferred family of testers is shown in Table I.
[Ref. 13:p. 3.3] Also shown is their year of initial delivery, manufacturer,
functional classification, and original weapon system application. While most were
initially developed to test a single weapon system, each now supports a broad mix of
aircraft types and many different WRAs and SRAs. For example, the CAT HlID was
18
designed as a digital SRA tester for the F-14A, but now also supports SRA testing and
some WRA testing for the A-7E, A-6E, E-2C and EA-6B. Others were developed from
the start as standard functional testers, such as the Hybrid Test System (HTS) which is
designed to test all hybrid and analog SRAs not testable by the CAT HID.
Table I. The Functional Family of ATE.
Initial
Year Name/Nomenclature Mfg. Functional Type Application
1972 VAST (AN/USM-247) Harris Digital-Analog-Hybrid Common
1975 CAT IIID (ANAJSM-429(V)) Grumman Digital-Analog-Hybrid F-14A
1976 IMUTS II (AN/USM-608(V)) Litton Inertial Navigation F/A-18
1979 EOSTS (AN/AAM-60(V-6)) Boeing Electro-Optics S-3A
1980 NEWTS (AN/USM-458) Sanders Electronic Warfare ALQ- 126B
1981 RADCOM (AN/USM-467) Grumman Radar E-2C
1983 ATS (AN/USM-470(V- 1)) Harris Digital-Analog-Hybrid F/A-I 8
1983 HTS (AN/USM-484) Harris Hybrid Common
1984 ATS (AN/USM-470(V-2)) Harris Digital-Analog-Hybrid SH-60
1985 AEWTS (AN/USM-487) Honeywell Eectronic Warfare ASPJ
6. The Long-Range Goal: CASS
The Consolidated Automated Support System is the outcome of the long-range
goal established by NAVAIR in 1979. Research and development work actually began
after the 1976 Marcy Report to explore new testing technology in recognition of two
factors. First, the Navy's existing test equipment, including test systems then under
development, had limited capability to meet the advanced testing needs of avionics to be
introduced in the late 1990s, so new systems were needed. Second, the functional family
of testers would be able to provide the short term support needed until a new general
purpose test system could be developed and fielded in an orderly and controlled manner.
[Ref. l:p. 2-2]
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Advances in microelectronics promised to be both a challenge and an
opportunity in this long-range development effort, presenting many problems in weapon
system measurement and diagnostics, while offering many opportunities for improved test
system capabilities. Research and development focused on several areas: [Ref. 5:App.
El
Avionic design for testability, including BIT, large scale integrated (LSI) circuits,
self-test and self-repair through reconfiguration, printed circuit boards, ron-
electronic equipment, and packaging.
" Advanced ATE concepts, including test system fault isolation (to eliminate
ambiguity between faults in the ATE, TPS and UUT), improved interface devices,
human factors, and use of microcomputers for program control and stimulation.
" ATE software, including design and verification, automation of documentation, built
in checks for test programs, and program standardization.
* Automatic test program generation, including development of circuit analysis
algorithms and failure mode analysis techniques.
* Self-calibration technology, including development of built-in standards, mobile
calibrating packs and automatic calibration techniques.
* Hardware and software configuration management, including development of
distributed data bases and mass storage to manage specifications, engineering
changes, and software test programs and documentation.
* ATE technical training, including development of interactive programs and
simulators to improve learning, cut costs and reduce reliance on ATE equipment for
operator training.
* Microcomputer testing technology, including development of BIT design and
acquisition strategies to improve testing and fault detection/isolation in
microcomputer based electronic subsystems.
While many avionic and ATE systems acquired in recent years have benefited
from these R&D efforts, the CASS program has sought to integrate the state of the art in
each of these areas to achieve an optimal, standardized test system. The outcome of this
development effort is the subject of the next chapter.
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m. THE CASS PROGRAM
This Chapter describes the CASS program in terms of equipment, acquisition
strategy and introduction plan to lay the groundwork for later evaluation of the system.
It is organized first to provide program goals and an overview, then to present
progressively greater detail about its relevant attributes and acquisition/introduction
strategy.
A. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The Consolidated Support System Project was established in 1978 in response to
the NAVAIR ATE Program Plan to provide a long-term solution to the many historical
ATE problems and meet the challenge of emerging testing needs through the year 2000.
Its objectives are two-fold; first, to improve throughput (by reducing repair cycle
time) which will result in improved weapon system operational availability (A.), readiness
and capability to meet combat sortie requirements; second, to standardize ATE hardware,
software and support, which will result in decreased cost of ownership of both avionic
systems and avionic test equipment. [Ref. 12:Addendum A, p. 1]
B. PROGRAM OVERVIEW
NAVAIR has called CASS and the T-45 jet trainer its two most important
acquisition programs. CASS receives this high priority for two reasons. First, schedules
for new weapon systems can slip with far less damage to the Naval Air mission than even
a small slip in the CASS program schedule. The latter could have a ripple effect on the
timing of many weapon system introductions. [Ref. 14] Second, failure to
achieve its technical, logistic or performance goals could seriously impact operational
readiness of weapons systems targeted for CASS support. [Ref. 15:p. 8]
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CASS is assigned acquisition category (ACAT) IIS due to its relatively high cost
and special SECNAV interest (ACAT I is the highest level, generally assigned to weapon
system programs costing over $1 billion). Right on schedule so far, it is nearing the end
of Phase H, full scale engineering development (FSED), by General Electric Company in
Huntsville, Alabama. Its next major milestone (IA) is set for August 1990, when low
rate initial production (LRIP) of 81 CASS stations is scheduled to begin. Full production
will result in a total inventory of 775 CASS stations and their ancillary hardware.
Technical evaluation (TECHEVAL, DT-IICI) and pre-operational evaluation (OPEVAL,
OT-HA) are being conducted concurrently during Spring, 1990 at the Naval Air Test
Center in Patuxent River, Maryland.
The remainder of this overview highlights the significant events in the development
schedule and fleet introduction of CASS.
1. Schedule
Significant future events are summarized in the program schedule shown in
Figure 6. [Ref. 12] Following TECHEVAL, CASS stations will be provided to the
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) for full OPEVAL (OT-LIB). In this
evaluation, CASS must demonstrate its technical performance as well as the performance
of all logistic elements, including training, spare parts and technical data needed to keep
CASS operational. TPS developed for 'support of support' (SOS) for CASS SRAs will
be also be tested. (SOS TPS enable one CASS station to test failed SRAs from another
CASS station.)
After successful completion of testing and correction of any problems, a
decision will be sought to proceed to full rate production (FRP) in mid 1991 (Milestone
fIB). The Option I deliverables shown in the figure are the CASS stations produced
during LRIP (81 stations), and Option H and II deliverables are those produced during







which is the earliest date the Navy will accept any production articles. Initial operating
capability (IOC) will occur concurrently with the material support date (MSD) and Navy
support date (NSD) in mid-1992. [Ref. 15:Attach. 1]
2. Fleet Introduction Overview
Some of the CASS stations produced during LRIP are scheduled to be
delivered beginning in late 1991 to weapon system contractors and Naval Aviation Depots
(NADEPS) for TPS development, and to Naval Air Maintenance Training Groups
(NAMTRAGRUs) for operator and maintainer training. [Ref. 16:p. 1]
Fleet deliveries to sea and shore AIMDs for operational support of weapon
systems are scheduled to begin in mid-1993 after all logistic elements are in place. These
elements include training of fleet technicians, provisioning and delivery of spares, and
organic depot support. There will be no phased support; all logistics will be delivered up
front with the CASS station, and all elements are priced into the single firm fixed price
development contract.
During its transition into operational service, CASS must accept the workload
of many existing testers as well as the workload of new weapon systems never before
supported, such as the A-12 aircraft. The sequencing of TPS development and stand-up
of CASS at each site will be based on the timing of weapon system support requirements
and the urgency of replacing obsolete testers. NAVAIR has drafted an introduction plan
covering the period FY-90 to FY-99 which is based on a policy requiring all new aviation
electronic systems to be supported by CASS and all existing systems to make the
transition to CASS as they are modified.
The Navy Program Decision Meeting which granted CASS approval to enter
full scale engineering development (FSED) in 1986 also directed that CASS be integrated
into the surface Navy as the single Navy-wide standard test system, with NAVAIR as the
lead hardware systems command for equipment acquisition. While its current operational
requirement is for support of avionic systems only, it will be rewritten in the future to
reflect this expanded tasking and CASS development will continue.
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C. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The CASS system is a modular, reconfigurable, computer driven automatic test
station capable of providing performance verification and diagnostic fault isolation for all
complex electronic components. It is primarily intended for I level shore, carrier and
mobile van maintenance environments, but will also be used at the depot. Its design is
intended to make it versatile and expandable to accept the Navy's testing needs through
the year 2011.
1. Configurations
CASS has five configurations which together are able to perform the same
testing functions as the full family of testers (FOT). These are:
* Core or Hybrid station for testing general digital, RF, and analog SRAs and WRAs.
0 Electro-optical (EO)
* Electronic warfare (EW)
• Digital/display (DDS)
0 Communications, navigation and identification (CNI)
0 Radar
There is also a portable version, the CASS Portable Test Set (CPTS), designed
to meet Marine Corps forward deployed needs and future NAVSEA shipboard
requirements. The portable version is a series of stacked suitcases that may be configured
to be functionally identical to any of the mainframe CASS stations except that it lacks
some power protection devices. [Ref. 15]
Figure 7 illustrates these configurations. [Ref. 8] The hybrid station has five
racks and is the core of each of the others. It can be reconfigured into any of the other
stations by adding additional circuit cards and a sixth rack. For example, the hybrid can
be converted into an EO station by adding an EO rack and circuit cards, or into an EW,
CNI or radar station by adding a radio frequency (RF) rack and the appropriate additional
circuit cards. The CPTS may be similarly tailored to meet the functional testing













Figure 7. CASS Station Configurations.
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Figure 7 also shows the ancillary equipment required, such as another rack to
enable pneumatic component testing, a printer, and an EO dolly to support the A-6E
forward looking infra-red (FLIR)/laser turret. The next section explains the upper portion
of the figure by describing the station architecture.
2. Architecture
The basic station functions, such as stimulus, measurement, switching, digital,
power, and bus interface are all contained in the hybrid station, with additional stimulus
and response functions provided in other configurations. Rather than using a separate
instrument for each of these functions (such as a digital voltmeter) as in many current
ATE which use commercial off-the-shelf instruments, CASS uses a modular approach,
with each function shown in Figure 7 performed by a series of circuit cards. This enables
elimination of all unneeded functions such as displays, display electronics, packaging and
enclosures, and consolidation of cormmon functions such as switching, power and control
electronics. A distributed ..... microprocessor asset controllers combine the circuit cards
to create each instrumcn Anction needed. The single Microvax I miniprocessor serves
as the station controller for the test program, peripherals such as a printer, and the asset
controllers, which are linked by an internal ethemet. An external ethernet may be used
to establish a local area network (LAN) connecting many widely distributed CASS
statiors and a management information system such as NALCOMIS, presently being
implemented to provide I level maintenance management and reporting. [Ref. 8]
The five core racks contain, from left to right: [Ref. 17]
* Power circuitry needed to protect the station, TPS and UUT from power transients
and harmonic distortion, including a limited battery backup and circuitry to provide
automatic shutdown of the station for longer transients.
" Programmable power supplies needed for testing present and future UUTs.
* Station control, containing the Microvax I computer, Winchester drive for
magnetic disks, opticti disks drive, embedded standards for self-calibration, and
operator interface, which consists of a plasma display, keyboard, bar code reader
and trackball.
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" General purpose interface (GPI) for adapting to TPS, and digital test unit (DTU)
and DTU power supplies.
" Additional DTU power supplies and space for growth to accommodate new testing
requirements.
These hardware components are designed to place all required capability in the
CASS station, eliminating the need for complex active circuitry in interconnection devices
(IDs), as is often required for existing testers.
There is a high degree of commonality among the internal components of the
various configurations, as illustrated by Figure 8. For example, circuit cards (SRAs) in
the EW station are 84% common to the hybrid. To convert a hybrid station into an EW
requires insertion of 24 SRAs internally in the hybrid station, plus connection of the RF
rack. [Ref. 8]
This commonality between the five configurations is important for several
reasons. First, it enables easy reconfiguration, as discussed above. This reconfigurability
allows the suite of CASS stations at a site to be tailored to meet the site-specific
workload of WRAs and SRAs, which constantly changes with the aircraft deckload and
introduction of new avionic systems. Second, commonality is the key to standardizing
ATE logistic support because it results in fewer types of components and fewer spares,
less technical data, and reduced requirements for operator and maintainer training. Third,
it permits limited TPS transportability between stations. Transportability means that a
TPS that will work on one configuration will also work on other CASS configurations.
For example, some TPSs designed for the CNI configuration will also work on the radar
configuration. All TPSs designed for the hybrid will transport to any other station. This
attribute creates considerable flexibility at a site; workload may be redistributed to other
CASS stations when a station goes down, and the site has improved capacity to respond
to surges in operating tempo without creation of long testing backlog. [Ref. 8]
3. System Software
CASS software consists of the following elements, described below:
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" CASS station operating system
* Weapon system, or operational TPS programs (OTPS)
* Self-maintenance
* Intermediate Maintenance Operations Management (IMOM) System
• Operational Management System (OMS)
" Support
The station operating software, called the Test Executive, runs on the Microvax
III computer. It accepts code from the TPS program to execute the test, controls stimulus
and measurement devices to exercise the UUT, and returns measurement data to the
Microvax III station controller computer for evaluation. It also controls operator
interfaces such as the plasma display screen and keyboard and accesses a resident library
on a mass storage device. The separate microprocessor asset controllers have software
to control individual functional circuit cards called for by the Test Executive. Programs
are written in a variety of languages, including FORTRAN, PASCAL, and assembly
language.
All operational TPS software used by a particular station configuration at a site
are stored in the resident library and may be drawn down on call by the operator to run
a test on a UUT or may be transferred to other stations via the external ethernet. All
OTPS is written in the DOD standard test language known as ATLAS.
CASS uses self-maintenance software to perform continuous on-line monitoring
and calibration of station and TPS interface circuits simultaneously with UUT testing.
It controls calibration standards and fault detection and isolation within CASS, plus any
line loss parametric compensation requirements. The self-ir intenance software monitors
over 9,200 station test points for fault detection and isolation. [Ref. 8]
The Intermediate Maintenance Operations Management System (IMOM)
performs automated test data collection and storage and is the system which establishes
the communication with NALCOMIS via the external ethernet. The IMOM system
continuously collects data reflecting station status, operational availability, failed station
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hardware that was isolated using the self-maintenance function, station usage, operator
identification, and the results of UUT testing. [Ref. 191
The Operational Management System (OMS) aids I level maintenance
personnel with management of production, manpower and material control. This includes
assigning UUTs to particular workcenters to balance workload and minimize turn around
time by projecting/simulating shop performance under different constraints, workloads,
conditions and operating policies. OMS software contains applications utilities such as
network protocol handlers, input/output functions, and mathematical and statistical
packages. Working together, the IMOM and OMS systems are designed to create a
completely automated ATE shop. [Ref. 2]
CASS support software is used to assist in the design, development, testing,
and support of station software, self-maintenance software, IMOM and OTPS. Many TPS
development software tools are part of the CASS station deliverables.
D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
CASS is managed by NAVAIR with a program organization (PMA-260) rather than
by the support equipment acquisition staff (AIR-552) as has been done for all previous
ATE acquisitions. This management organization was directed by SECNAV during the
pre-FSED phase in March 1985, when CASS was designated the standard ATE for the
Navy. [Ref. 12] This direction reflects the facts that CASS' scope and acquisition
strategy resemble that of a major weapon system far more than a support equipment
system. The key features of its acquisition strategy are: [Ref. 2]
* A single firm fixed price (FFP) contract with GE for FSED and three years of
production options for 327 stations, which NAVAIR may change up or down by
50% to meet introduction requirements and funding constraints.
* A contract awarded based on performance specifications and equally weighted
technical, acquisition/life cycle cost and logistic support factors.
* Military standard logistic support analysis (LSA).
* A dual manufacturing source, Martin Marietta Technical Services Company
(MMTSC), to ensure head-to-head competition for the life of the program.
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" Full data rights and validated level III engineering drawings.
" The contractor must demonstrate full performance (DT-IC and OT-LB) prior to
acceptance of the first production article.
* A performance warrantee for four years after government acceptance of each end
item.
The warrantee clause in the CASS FSED and initial production contract covers
design and manufacturing requirements, defects in material and workmanship,
technical/logistic performance, and reliability and maintainability (R&M). R&M
requirements are mean time between failure (MTBF) of 148 hours, mean time to repair
(MTTR) of 2.0 hours, 100% BIT detection, and 95% BIT isolation to one SRA. The
OMS system will be used to collect performance data, and will be used to enforce
technical, logistic, and R&M performance. [Ref. 15:p. 6]
1. Acquisition History
The initial conceptual phase of the program began in 1978 with small studies
designed to augment the Marcy Report by clarifying ATE problems in procurement,
mnagement, operation and future test requirements. Acquisition Phase 0 began in
August 1980, when CSS was approved as an ACAT nI project by a Navy decision
coordinating paper (NDCP). On 31 December 1981, five contracts were competitively
awarded for concept exploration and definition. Contractors included GE, General
Dynamics, Sperry, Grumman and Harris, chosen from 135 companies who responded to
the request for proposal (RFP). Their studies were completed in September 1983 and
encompassed system requirements analysis, determination of appropriate performance and
logistic support specifications, systems engineering tradeoff analysis, and creation of
computer models to simulate the performance of their proposed systems.
During Phase I, Concept Demonstration/Validation (then called pre-FSED), two
industry design teams competed for the FSED contract. These teams were headed by
Grumman (with GD and Hughes as partners) and GE (with Honeywell, Northrup, and
Astrosystems as partners). [Ref. 20] GE won the contract in December 1986.
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Soon after that, SECNAV approved Milestone I entry into FSED in a February 1987
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). [Ref. 15:p. 1]
2. Full Scale Engineering Development
NAVAIR awarded GE the contract for FSED based on equal weighting of
technical, logistics and cost criteria in the evaluation. As prime contractor, GE awarded
a subcontract to Martin Marietta as the dual manufacturing source (DMS) in December
1988. Under this contract, GE and Martin Marietta will share production of the first 327
CASS stations with a 60/40% split. As an incentive to ensure full DMS qualification, GE
payments are contingent on Martin Marietta's on-time delivery of exact copies (verified
through PCA and operational testing). The two companies will then go into head-to-head
competition for the remainder of the life of the system, with each guaranteed at least 40%
of the award. Distribution will be based on price and past performance. [Ref. 15 :p. 4]
Currently, 91 Martin Marietta employees are integrated with GE employees at their
Huntsville site for training in co-assembly. Martin Marietta is constructing a 32,000
square foot production facility in Americus, Georgia. [Ref. 16:p. 4]
3. Logistic Support Elements
Because most of the problems identified by the fleet in the Marcy Report
concem supportability issues, logistic supportability has been a major CASS program goal
since its inception. Heavy emphasis was placed on the logistic support analysis (LSA)
process to ensure that support continually influenced design through an iterative process.
Additionally, the usual concept of phased support during system introduction was
abandoned during negotiation for the FSED contract. Instead, all logistic support
elements were priced into the development and production contract, including
development of training, maintenance publications and all other data requirements,
eliminating the need for interim support from the contractor.
The CASS program has also pursued several other logistic support initiatives.
CASS was developed using concepts of the DOD Computer-Aided Acquisition and
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Logistic Support initiative (CALS) for automated digital interchange of technical
information between contractors and NAVAIR. CALS was created in an effort to reduce
costs and improve quality and integration of information used for design, manufacture and
ILS.
The most noteworthy product of this effort in the CASS program is digitized
technical manuals (paperless publications). Known as the Automated Technical
Information (ATI) System, all of the many volumes of technical manuals are stored on
5.25 inch erasable optical disks, which are FSED phase deliverables. Some of its features
include menus, help files, a mouse/cursor, icons, multi-windowing, browse features,
electronic bookmarks, and automated technical publication deficiency reports (TPDRs).
There are many advantages to this paperless publication system, including
increased operator efficiency, faster updates, and reduced storage requirements and
transportation costs. It also allows efficient use of other CALS tools, such as computer
aided design and the LSA process, used in the creation and quality control of ATI
publications. [Ref. 16:p. 3]
As noted above, the CASS FSED contract requires full data rights and delivery
of all technical data (in both manual and digitized formats) including level III engineering
drawings, sufficient for future competitive reprocurement of end items and spare parts
(with the exception of some embedded commercial test equipment (CTE)). All data and
publications must be delivered after they are validated during OPEVAL, no later than the
physical configuration audit, which is well before fleet delivery. [Ref. 12:p. 13]
Formal training courses will also be evaluated at OPEVAL, then updated to
correct problems identified prior to delivery to the Naval Training Group
(NAMTRAGRU). Courses and personnel classifications have been created for CASS
operator/maintainer and maintenance technician. An embedded training module is also
available on the ATI system to support and augment the formal instruction which allows
on-call interactive refresher training for operators and maintainers. A CASS innovation
is the development of a CASS supervisor course which includes use of the OMS,
IMOMS, ethemet LAN, ATI, and embedded training systems. Manpower planning is an
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iterative process driven by the introduction plan which is supported by the Navy Training
Plan (NTP) scheduled for approval in August 1990. [Ref. 21
The CASS program is also the prototype for a new approach to supply support
transitioning, intended to allow CASS to achieve ASO material support concurrent with
IOC and be fully supportable before it hits the fleet. This ASO/NAVAIR joint venture
aims to provision spares in one third the normal time by paralleling provisioning events.
Rather than following a sequential process of ordering end items, data analysis and file
loading, and finally spares procurement, spares will be delivered by GE concurrently with
CASS end items. This will achieve economies of scale as well as eliminate interim
contractor support. The danger of this approach is that the first spares procurement is
right in the middle of test and evaluation, before the CASS configuration is frozen. As
a result, GE will accept the risk for configuration control of both the CASS station and
spares as per the FSED contract. [Ref. 21]
4. Streamlining and Costs
Acquisition streamlining initiatives in the CASS program resulted in 48%
savings in the FSED contract with GE. in the approved CASS NDCP of 18 April 1986
NAVAIR estimated a cost of $341 million for FSED during fiscal years 87-91. The firm
fixed price offer from GE for FSED and initial production was $164.4 million, which is
$176.8 million less than the estimate. The CASS program subsequently received a
number of awards in recognition of this cost savings, including the OSD Acquisition
Streamlining Excellence Award. Streamlining initiatives were: [Ref. 22]
" Converted from design specifications to performance specifications.
" Reduced first tier specifications from 126 to 95.
* Converted all 3,000 second tier specifications to guidance only.
" Reduced the contract data requirements list (CDRL) from 359 to 258.
" Eliminated the engineering development model (EDM).
" Eliminated test requirement data (TRD) for support of support (SOS) TPS.
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" Eliminated interim contractor support by making the material support date (MSD)
and Navy support date (NSD) concurrent with initial operating capability (10C).
" Required the contractor to propose additional CALS initiatives.
Among the most important features of the CASS acquisition are use of a fim
fixed price development and production contract containing performance rather than
design specifications, with all logistic support elements priced in. They were the key to
these streamlining achievements.
E. CASS INTRODUCTION PLAN
The CASS Program Office (PMA-260) and the Support Equipment Division (AIR-
552) work jointly to define the actions and milestones necessary to successfully introduce
CASS to the fleet. This effort requires identifying existing and emerging testing
requirements and setting priorities to establish the sequence in which they will receive
CASS support. From this plan, the transition team schedules TPS development and CASS
station delivery to each site in the right quantities and configurations. This process is
iterative, and will continue throughout the CASS life cycle.
The following paragraphs examine the criteria for selecting weapon systems to be
introduced or transitioned to CASS, and summarizes the first-round CASS introduction
plan, the process for determining site-specific CASS requirements, and the TPS
acquisition strategy.
1. Weapon System Selection Criteria
Systems to be transitioned or introduced to CASS will be identified based on
the following NAVAIR policy, established in 1987 to halt development of any new ATE
systems and to establish CASS as the standardized ATE for all avionics systems of the
future: [Ref. 23]
* All electronic systems requiring ATE support with IOC dates during FY-92 or
beyond will be supported on CASS.
* All existing electronic systems will be transitioned to CASS as they are modified
or upgraded.
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* All electronic systems with an IOC during FY-90 through FY-92 will receive
interim support until supported by CASS. (For example, the F-14D will be
supported by RADCOM until CASS is ready to accept its testing requirements.)
0 Testing that is presently done on obsolete ATE which can no longer be
economically supported will be off-loaded to CASS based on fleet support priorities
and economic analysis.
2. Summary of Introduction Plan
Figure 9 is the product of this policy. It identifies the weapon systems
scheduled to be introduced or transitioned to CASS support through fiscal year 1999.
[Ref. 24] CASS 'introduction' applies to new weapon systems never before
supported, while 'transition' applies to existing ATE that will off-load their testing of
WRAs and SRAs to CASS and then be retired.
Appendix A shows the schedule for these introductions and transitions (with
the weapon and ATE systems listed in alphabetical order) in a series of six bar charts.
Many of the weapons systems will require some form of interim support if they reach
IOC before CASS and CASS TPS are available. These periods are shown as shaded bars;
the beginning of the full clear bars indicate the start of full CASS support. For example,
the "F-14D Misc" WRAs and SRAs will be supported by RADCOM and other existing
testers from the first quarter of 1991 until the second quarter of 1995, when CASS will
begin to accept some of the testing load. Full CASS support will begin in the second
quarter of 1998.
The AAM-60 electro-optical station will be the first to be transitioned
(beginning in 1994), chosen because it is obsolete and difficult to support. It tests WRAs
for the A-6E forward looking infra-red (FLIR) and laser system. VAST will follow later
in 1994, so all the F-14A and S-3 WRAs and SRAs it supports must be offloaded. VAST
has a high priority to undergo transition because it must be removed from carriers to




A-12 CAINS H JTIDS I/D
AAAM EA-6B AIP MARK XV DEPOT
AIWS EA-6B AN/ALQ-149 MARK XV WRA
AMRAAM LOT 1 EA-6B RPG MINI-DAMA
AMRAAM LOT 2 F-14D AN/APG-71 MMR/ARN-138
AN/AAS-33A F-14D Misc. P-3C UPDATE IV
AN/ALE-47 F-14D SMS PHOENIX LOT I
AN/ALE-50 GPS/ARN-151 PHOENIX LOT 2
AN/ALQ-126B GPWS/TRANSPORT SAHRS
AN/ALQ-156 HARM LOT 1 SCS
AN/ALQ-165 HARM LOT 2 SH-60F
AN/ALR-67 ASR HELO/GPWS SH-60F/ALFS
AN/APS-137 HNVS SIDEARM H
AN/ARC-210 IRSTS SPARROW
ATARS F-18 JTIDS TOMAHAWK
ATE Transitions:
AAM-60 (A-6) RADCOM (A-6E)
AAM-60 (S-3) RADCOM (E-2C)
ASM-614 (EA-6B) RADCOM (EA-6B)
ASM-614 (S-3) TMV (F-14A+)
EETS (AV-8B) VAST (F-14A)
HATS (S-3) VAST (S-3)
Figure 9. CASS Candidate Programs, FY-90 to FY-99.
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VAST with one CASS. The AAM-60 station and the ASM-614 station for the EA-6B
will also be one-for-one replacements. [Ref. 16 :p.3] A total of 19 CASS stations are
expected to be required on an average carrier to support the full workload. [Ref. 1 :p. 5-5]
3. Site Planning
The goal of the CASS introduction plan is to optimize the CASS testing
resources at each site. To do this, planners must select the right weapon system UUTs
to be introduced or transitioned, and then deliver tailored CASS configurations to handle
the workload for the least cost.
The process of optimizing the support resources at each site will be managed
using three computer models collectively known as the System Synthesis Model (SSM).
The first is a mapping model that identifies CASS configurations able to support each
UUT. These are determined by matching UUT parametric requirements, such as power,
signal stimulus and measurement, to the CASS assets that provide these necessary
functions.
The second model is a workload planning model that determines CASS
quantities and configurations required for each site. The key input parameters are CASS
operational availability, the configurations specified by the mapping model, and UUT
induction rates. Induction rates are based on projected aircraft flying hours and MTBF
of each UUT. This model is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. [Ref. 24:p. 1l]
The third model is a queuing simulation which analyzes the sensitivity of the
workload model output to changes in input parameters. The simulation will be used
before NAVAIR makes final decisions on the quantity and configuration of CASS stations
to deliver to each site. [Ref. 25]
These three models are vital for accurate determination of site requirements.
The dynamics of the decision process are very complex for a number of reasons. First,
thousands of UUTs will ultimately be supported by CASS. Second, TPS transportability
allows many UUTs to be tested on multiple configurations. Third, the workload at each
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site will undergo constant changes as transition progresses and as weapon systems come
and go, forcing stations to be periodically reconfigured.
CASS site planning must also deal with significant constraints which may
upset plans after they are finalized, such as the availability of funds for CASS production
and TPS procurement, the production output of GE and Martin Marietta, and the
performance of TPS yet to be developed. These constraints may affect repair throughput
and alter projected site workloads. [Ref. 24:p. 7]
The CASS introduction plan is particularly vulnerable to slippages in TPS
development. For example, NAVAIR calculated the impact of slipping F-14D TPS
development, which is the top CASS requirements driver. (The A-12 program is the next
major driver.) Expenditure of $7.7 million in funding budgeted for this effort in FY-90
is at risk of being deferred until FY-91, which would delay F-14D initial organic
capability by 12 months. This slippage would increase AVDLR costs by approximately
$30 million to sustain interim support beyond the F-14D MSD. Because it would also
delay the offload of VAST and RADCOM, this slippage would disrupt planning for the
introduction of other new weapon systems because CASS cannot be installed aboard
space-constrained carriers until these other ATE stations are removed. This example is
intended to show the how a host of interdependent factors must be orchestrated to achieve
an orderly CASS introduction. [Ref. 26]
4. TPS Acquisition Strategy
The key elements of the NAVAIR (AIR-552) TPS acquisition strategy are:
[Ref. 27]
" Development contracts will be firm fixed price, sole source with the weapon system
prime contractors.
* Production contracts will be openly competed.
* The government will provide to contractors two sets of UUTs for each TPS, CASS
stations and TPS development tools as government furnished equipment (GFE).
* The government will provide maintenance and spares for the CASS station and
UUT.
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Thirty months is the targeted lead time for TPS delivery, from identification
of a nquimet using the tcss described above unil the date it is needed in the flet. [Ref. 28.-p. 5]
To enhance this effort, GE has delivered a suite of TPS development tools as part of the
FSED contract. These include ATLAS language compilers, translators, editors,
FORTRAN debugging programs, automatic test program generators (ATPGs) and a CASS
Test Executive simulator. GE has prepared a 20 volume TPS developers' guide and is
preparing a TPS development training course.
The standard interface environment with CASS, combined with the Test
Executive simulator (which runs on any VAX computer), allows early design,
development and testing of TPS programs, interconnection devices and cabling without
a CASS station. GE demonstrated this capability by completing most of the A-6E
FLIR/laser TPS development and fabrication before the first pre-production station was
available. A similar approach is intended for the huge development effort that lies ahead
to reduce dependence on GFE which is a critical cost and schedule driver. [Ref. 16:p.
3]
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IV. THE AVIONICS REPAIR PROCESS INVOLVING I LEVEL ATE
Many of the historical ATE problems the CASS program was created to solve are
rooted in the repair process. This chapter describes the supply/AIMD repair cycle using
existing testers to clarify the functional role of ATE and lay a foundation for the
comparative evaluation of CASS in the next chapter.
A. REPAIR PROCESS EFFECTS ON SPARES REQUIREMENTS
Intermediate and depot level repair is intended to fill supply shelves, not holes in
aircraft, so the repair process is intimately related to weapon system spares requirements.
This section explains that relationship.
The I level maintenance cycle normally begins when squadron technicians fault
isolate an aircraft system failure to a specific WRA. The maintenance concept for aircraft
typically requires that 0 level technicians perform all on-equipment work. Any
component that is not repairable on the aircraft is removed and turned in to the local
supply department and a replacement is requested. This requisition is ideally filled 'off
the shelf,' while the failed component is sent to the local AIMD for repair.
The AVCAL (aboard ship) or SHORECAL (ashore) includes thousands of WRAs
and SRAs stocked to meet the local demand for spare repairable and consumable parts.
The fast movers receive special handling and are kept in locations close to their squadron
or AIMD customers to speed their delivery. These fast movers are kept in the rotatable
pool (for WRAs), module pool (for SRAs) or pre-expended bin (for consumables).
The full AVCAL is a level of safety stock designed to provide 90% protection
against stockout for three months without resupply. Its range is dependent on the number
of types of aircraft and the commonality of WRAs among aircraft aboard the carrier, and
its depth is dependent on expected demand (failure rates) during the three-month pei iod
without resupply. In the case of I level repairables, carrying a full three-month supply
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can be avoided by repairing WRAs on the ship. Thus, the 90% protection level for these
items need only protect for the repair turn-around time (TAT) for the I level activity.
Additional units are needed, however, to accomodate the beyond capabilty of maintenance
(BCM) rate. Thus, an attrition demand level is also provided to cover the three-month
deployment assumption.
The Aviation Supply Office (ASO) computes the size and composition of the
AVCAL using "ASO manual rules." The average AVCAL quantity of each repairable
item is calculated by multiplying its average repair TAT by the average number of
removals per day. Calculations are typically based on Navy-wide averages for removals
per flight hour. Removals per day equals:
(Removals/Flight Hour) * (Right Hours/Aircraft/Day)
* (Number of Aircraft)
This average is used in the Poisson probability distribution to determine the number
of units of an item which are needed to provide 90% protection over TAT. There is also
a special consideration for low demand items which would otherwise have zero allowance
under these rules.
Figure 10 shows AVCAL levels for various TATs and removal rates and assuming
no BCMs (thus no attrition) calculated by the Center for Naval Analysis.
[Ref. 29:p. 19] It illustrates that the higher the removal rate for a
component, the greater will be the potential for decreases in TAT to cause large AVCAL
reductions, with corresponding percentage reductions in weapon system life cycle costs.
For example, given a component with 0.7 removals per day and TAT of 20 days,
reducing TAT to 10 days would reduce the AVCAL allowance for this item from 20 to
11.
The BCM rate also has an important effect on sparing requirements. Table I shows
the average quantities of a component in the off-ship repair/resupply pipeline for various
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Figure 10. AVCAL Levels for Various TAT and Removal Rates (BCM rate = 0)
support period without resupply. These data were determined by the Center for Naval
Analysis. [Ref. 30:p. 5] The table shows that the average number of units
needed to cover attrition drops quickly with decreases in BCM rate, while the number of
units needed to cover the repair TAT stays fairly constant over the typical range of BCM
rates between 0 and 0.3. For example, reducing BCM rate from 0.2 to 0.1 decreases the
number of units in the resupply pipeline from 18 to 9 and increases units in the repair
pipeline from 4.0 to 4.5.
These relationships have profound implications for the repair process and ATE; any
improvements in equipment or process which reduce TAT or BCM rates can significantly
reduce the quantity and cost of weapon system spares required to achieve the same
protection against stockout during a deployment.
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Table II. Average Number of Units in Repair/Resupply Pipelines
BCM Rate Repair Resupply Total
.0 5.0 .0 5.0
.1 4.5 9.0 13.5
.2 4.0 18.0 22.0
.5 2.5 45.0 47.5
.8 1.0 72.0 73.0
.9 .5 81.0 81.5
1.0 .0 90.0 90.0
B. THE REPAIR PROCESS: INDUCTION AND SCREENING
A WRA enters the AIMD repair cycle as a component awaiting maintenance
(AWM) and joins the repair queue, or backlog. The aviation material screening unit
(AMSU) of the AIMD screens the WRA by part number to determine whether the AIMD
has repair capability. If it does not, the WRA is returned to supply for shipment to depot
maintenance as a BCM component. If full or partial capability exists, the WRA is sent
to the appropriate shop for induction into the shop's repair queue.
Once shop technicians receive the WRA it is screened again and is either inducted
into the shop repair queue or returned to supply (with Production Control approval) as a
BCM. If inducted by an ATE shop, technicians call it a UUT since WRAs, SRAs, and
ATE station repairables all intermingle in the same queue.
At the same time that a component is received by the shop, data (paper or
electronic) about the induction passes through Production Control (PC). PC assigns a
work priority for running WRAs and SRAs on ATE based on two rules: criticality of
need, followed by the first come, first served rule. In assigning a status based on
criticality of need, expeditious repairs (EXREPS) are priority 1, 'pool critical' and 'pool
zero balance' assets are priority 2, and all others are priority 3. [Ref. 6:p. 8-121
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EXREP status occurs when a replacement for a failed repairable part that downs an
aircraft is not on the shelf for immediate issue. The repair pipeline must therefore work
to fill the aircraft 'hole,' instead of the supply shelf. Pool critical status is assigned to an
inducted component when its stocking level drops to a certain percentage of the
allowance, and pool zero balance status is assigned when there is a stockout. Toward the
end of a deployment, this should occur 10% of the time with the standard 90% protection
level.
An additional priority status exists at shore AIMNDs, which typically support carriers
between at sea periods by repairing all components that were in the carrier's repair
pipeline at the time the ship pulled into port. As the carrier's deployment date
approaches, these 'repair and return' inductions compete against EXREPS from the shore
squadrons for priority 1. The overall effect of the priority system is to create a lumpy
demand for high priority repairs.
C. ATE SETUP AND TESTING
Components inducted to the ATE shop are set up for testing by connecting the UUT
to the ATE station by means of the TPS. Setup operations are broken down into external
setup, performed off-line while other UUTs are running on the station, and internal setup.
performed on-line with the station idle. All internal operations are 'dead time' for the
station. External operations include collecting the necessary TPS, such as cables, active
power supplies, the ID and test program disk, and setting it all up with the UUT on a
roll-around cart. Interr '1 operations involve plugging it all in to the station, installing the
TPD, and downloading the program. Station self-test and calibration are also internal
operations if they cannot be performed while the station is running another program.
The setup often contributes to UUT backlog, because many operations can only be
performed internally when the station is idle. As each site typically has an allowance for
only one TPS and one ID of each type, the individual component is serviced by a single
channel queuing system (one server) regardless of the number of ATE stations. One ID
may also be shared between multiple TPS, adapting to the ATE station on one side and
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to one of several TPS cable sets and UUTs on the other. UUTs which share a common
ID cannot be run concurrently regardless of their priority.
Once set up, the test program is downloaded and started. Numerous operator
interventions are typically required during the course of the test to answer programmed
questions, manually adjust ID power supplies, or operate switches on the UUT.
D. FAULT ISOLATION AND REPAIR
TPS software by design does not provide 100% fault isolation to a single SRA.
This is done in an attempt to reduce TPS development costs and program run time (PRT).
An ATE/TPS system's fault isolation capability for a particular UUT is instead expressed
as the probability that faults can be isolated to an 'ambiguity group' of a certain size. For
example, there may be a 95% probability of isolation to an ambiguity group of three
SRAs.
The size of the ambiguity group may affect the quantity of SRAs and WRAs needed
in the AVCAL. If repair is performed off-line (after disconnecting the UUT from the
ATE), all SRAs in the ambiguity group would require replacement, even though it is
likely that only one has a fault. If repair is performed on-line (while the UUT and ATE
are still connected), the ambiguity group affects elapsed maintenance time (EMT) because
SRAs will normally be replaced sequentially; if three SRAs are 'called out,' three cycles
must be made through the program. The EMT that results from this process is a primary
component of TAT and so affects WRA sparing. Ideally, cost-benefit analysis should be
used to tradeoff the cost of TPS fault ambiguity group size against the cost of AVDLR
and AVCAL allowances. If such a tradeoff were made, 95% isolation to three SRAs is
expected to be the lower limit of acceptable TPS performance. [Ref. 311
Figure 11 is a flow chart for the testing, fault isolation and repair process in an I
level ATE shop. [Ref. 6:Chapters 8, 13 and 14, and Ref. 10:p. C-31 The chart shows the
steps required to transform components inducted for repair into ready for issue (RFI) or
beyond capability of maintenance (BCM) WRAs and SRAs.
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The shortest path through the shop is the case of a 'false alarm,' which occurs when
the WRA runs 'end to end' (from the beginning to the end of the test program) with no
fault detected. This is path 1 in the figure and leads to a quick RFI if there are no other
known faults and the WRA is not a 'Y code' (meaning a squadron has rejected it after
a previous repair attempt).
Path 2 is the case of a WRA with a confirmed failure which is repaired on-line.
The ATE isolates the fault and SRAs are replaced sequentially with multiple cycles
though the program if the ambiguity group is greater than one. The WRA is retested end
to end after the repair is complete to ensure it was successful. If there are multiple
failures, the retest will branch into another fault isolation and repair cycle. Thus testing,
fault isolation and repair operations are performed iteratively during on-line repair; testing
is not a discrete step in the repair cycle.
Path 3 is the case of a WRA repaired off-line. Each cycle through the repair
process results in an on-station time delay for disconnecting and reconnecting the WRA.
The size of the ambiguity group does not affect EMT but does affect the number of SRAs
which must later be tested (some of which are false alarms).
Path 4 is the case of an SRA tested on ATE but completely repaired off-line. When
identified by the ATE as failed subcomponents of a WRA, they make a loop from the
ATE shop to supply and are re-inducted to AIMD for repair. They may be manually
tested by a specialized component repair shop or enter the same or another ATE queue
right along with WRAs. (For example, many WRAs tested on RADCOM have SRAs that
are tested on the CAT HID station.) In either case, the tester identifies failed circuit card
components which are then repaired or replaced by technicians in a separate micro-
miniature (2M) repair shop. Just as WRA repair shops are not intended to fill holes in
aircraft, SRA repair shops work to fill supply shelves, not holes in the next higher
assembly.
WRAs are normally repaired on-line because off-line repair results in higher SRA
spares requirements. To enable sequential replacement of SRAs in an ambiguity group
during on-line repair, special SRAs known as Maintenance Assist Modules (MAMs) are
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kept on hand in the ATE shop. MAMs are standard SRAs in every way, but are procured
for high failure rate SRAs specifically to enable fault isolation using ATE. After the test
is complete, they must be removed and replaced with standard SRAs obtained from the
supply department. When an SRA that is called out as a possible failure has no MAMs
available because the needed MAMs have failed or are not stocked, an operator typically
cannibalizes known good SRAs from awaiting parts (AWP) WRAs held by the supply
department or even from the other WRAs in the AWM queue. The operator may do this
with permission or even illegally in order to finish the test before breaking down the TPS
setup. Cannibalized SRAs are generally not removed once installed in contrast to MAMs,
so the repair step is completed during fault isolation.
The frequency of the program entry points for re-running portions of the test and
the number of operator interventions it requires are critical determinants of the time
needed to complete these iterations. Together, they determine how long it takes to retum
to the point at which the failure was detected to verify its correction and then continue
the test. If the design of the ATE allows it, experienced operators will often temporarily
re-program the software to create entry points closer to the portion that must be re-run,
reducing the time for each iteration by tens of minutes.
E. ATE AND TPS TROUBLESHOOTING
Test program strategies typically assume that all interconnecting wires in the TPS
and WRA are good and that WRA failure modes do not include multiple or intermittent
faults. If any of these assumptions are wrong, or there are software errors, the test
program may generate erroneous SRA failure callouts. The operator may suspect this if
a UUT will not pass a portion of the test after multiple replacements of an SRA.
This happens quite frequently with certain ATEtTPS combinations. For example,
NAS Norfolk AIMD at one point in 1988 documented an average of 50 manhours per day
troubleshooting failures in the many hundreds of interface pins between TPS and the
RADCOM and CAT ]ID stations. These were unreliable and very vulnerable to damage
from power fluctuations. [Ref. 32]
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The operator must troubleshoot the entire ATE/TPS/UUT system using ATE and
TPS off-line self-test capabilities or through the process of elimination. Self-test
capabilities typically consist of an ATE survey self-test which checks the instuments used
for that test, an ID confidence check, and a signature identity test, used to ensure all the
correct equipment is installed. The success of these checks in discriminating between
ATE, TPS and UUT faults is dependent upon their comprehensiveness, which is
frequently not sufficient to avoid using manual troubleshooting methods. [Ref. 31]
If self-testing does not isolate the fault, ATE station failures may be ruled out
through the process of elimination, starting by breaking down the whole setup and moving
the TPS and UUT to another of the same type of station if there is one at the site. If the
station is ruled out as a failure, TPS failures must be ruled out by substituting a known
good UUT. (Because there is normally only one TPS of each type per site, it cannot be
substituted.) Altemately, the operator/maintainer may turn to manual troubleshooting
using probes, ATE and TPS hardware schematics, program listings and test diagrams that
lay out the software flow contained in the (often unofficial or bootleg) TPS supplementary
data packages. There is a formal training track for this troubleshooting process only for
VAST technicians; all others must learn on the job.
If the long process of troubleshooting the ATE/TPS/UUI. system rules out station,
TPS and SRA problems, the shop will typically declare the UUT beyond capability of
maintenance (BCM).
This description of the repair process is important for understanding the factors
which influence ATE effectiveness. The next chapter is the evaluation of CASS. It
draws on this and each of the foregoing chapters in comparing CASS to the existing
family of testers to determine its ability to solve the most pressing ATE problems.
51
V. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF CASS
A. CRITERIA
The CASS Acquisition Plan presents the operational goals for the program which
are the basis for evaluation criteria used in this chapter. They are: [Ref. 12:p. Add. A,
p. 21
* Achieve a 100 percent improvement in testing throughput capability over existing
ATE.
" Provide a sustained test capability with higher reliability and potential for
reconfiguration to satisfy different test requirements.
" Reduce proliferation of ATE and improve logistics supportability and
maintainability through standardized hardware and software.
" Reduce ATE and avionic system life cycle costs.
These goals are interrelated. For example, reliability, maintainability, and logistic
supportability are key determinants of throughput. However, the cost of ATE stations
must be traded off against the cost of avionic system spares in the AVCAL/SHORECAL.
Many of these relationships were illustrated in describing the repair process in the last
chapter and are further clarified in this chapter.
CASS is evaluated against the following three criteria:
" Turnaround time (the reciprocal of throughput);
* Expandability to accept emerging testing requirements;
* ATE system life cycle costs.
These criteria encompass all four of the above goals. The remainder of this analysis




To achieve the CASS goal of 100% improvement in throughput, turnaround time
(TAT) must be reduced by 50%. Evaluation of the ability of CASS to achieve this goal
requires analysis of the ATE attributes that influence it, and comparison of CASS to
existing testers with respect to these attributes.
TAT of weapon system components through the local I level repair process is the
total time from removal of a suspected failed WRA from an aircraft, or SRA from a
WRA, until the WRA/SRA is RFI. When the repair process employs ATE systems, TAT
is built up from several components:
* Program Run Time (PRT): The time required for a no defect end-to-end test,
including programmed operator interventions.
* Elapsed Maintenance Time (EMT): The total time that a UUT occupies a station.
It includes PRT, troubleshooting time (while swapping MAMS or isolating
station/TPS failures), time spent looking for parts to use in troubleshooting, and
repair time (while replacing SRAs or making adjustments).
" Logistics Delay Time (LDT): Time spent in the ATE backlog waiting for station
availability, in a supply awaiting parts locker, and in the supply transportation and
administrative processing pipeline.
The key ATE system attributes affecting these times include the test strategy and
computer capabilities (which affect PRT and EMT), logistic supportability (which affects
EMT and LDT), and the number of ATE stations (which affects LDT). The following
sub-sections compare CASS and members of the FOT in these attributes.
1. Test Strategy
CASS TPS development plans call for use of functional test strategies rather
than the parametric test strategies now used in most TPS (although CASS is capable of
both). [Ref. 33] Parametric testing checks all input and output signals from a
UUT sequentially to determine if they comply with specifications. It is a strict test that
requires the UUT be restored to essentially factory condition to be declared RFI,
regardless of whether a detected deviation from specification caused the failure reported
by the squadron. Functional testing, on the other hand, screens the component only for
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failures that inhibit its proper operational performance. It is in many ways a 'confidence
check' or quick verify routine that checks most-likely-to-fail functions first, and then tests
in progressively greater depth to fault isolate to an ambiguity group. [Ref. 30:p. 11
A functional test strategy is faster than parametric in both PRT and time
required for fault isolation and results in lower BCM rates because it does not require the
component to meet factory specifications. It may gain further speed and program
simplification by monitoring the BIT circuits within a WRA for fault detection and
isolation. It may, however, cause shorter mean time between removal (MTBR) of WRAs
because the test may fail to detect true faults that would be detected by parametric testing,
and result in issue of WRAs that will not work well in the aircraft. Functional testing
will reduce weapon system spares allowances in the AVCAL/SHORECAL to the extent
that it reduces components in the repair cycle (through shorter TAT) and resupply
pipeline (through lower BCM rates) without an offsetting increase in spares due to their
reduced reliability. [Ref. 30:p. 1]
The Intermediate-Level Avionics Fault Tree Analyzer (IAFTA) ATE system
used to support the F-18 aircraft employs functional test strategies analogous to what are
planned for CASS TPS development. Comparison of IAFTA to the Avionics Test Set
(ATS) it replaced, which uses a traditional parametric strategy, shows the potential impact
on TAT of replacing other parametric testers with CASS.
A study conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis compared the TAT, BCM
rates and MTBR of 14 F-18 WRAs using IAFTA and ATS. Data was collected primarily
from two shore sites which had one of each tester. These were used almost equally to
repair the 14 WRAs. Their results are summarized in Table M1. Total TAT using IAFTA
was less than half the TAT using ATS (averaging 6.5 days compared to 2.5 days), as
shown in the second column. BCM rates using IAFTA dropped to a fraction of those
achieved on ATS (averaging 10% compared to less than 1%), as shown in the third
column. Some components tested on IAFTA showed slightly reduced reliability, indicated
by the increased WRA removal rates shown in the forth column.
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Table M. Comparison of the Effects of Functional Versus Parametric Test Strategies
(IAFTA vs ATS).
WRA TAT BCM % Removal # Spares
Rate
Nomen. ATS/AAFTA ATS/AFTA ATS/AFTA ATSIAFTA
ADC 6.5 3.5 2.5 0.0 .089 .307 2 _2:
RPYC 6.4 2.9 3.2 1.2 .158 .477 4 6
DataLink 2.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 .113 .062 1 0
SDC 6.3 5.4 5.4 2.4 .269 .737 3
SDR 8.2 5.5 8.6 0.0 .551 .630 8 5
CSC 6.1 2.8 4.8 0.0 .328 .481 3 3
HI 7.0 3.1 30.5 1.2 .551 .690 15 3
DDI 7.0 2.7 17.3 0.4 .568 .572 10 :3
HUD 5.5 3.6 12.1 5.0 .458 .259 1 6 2
SMP 6.6 2.1 8.0 0.0 .193 .113 2 1 1
Gun e/d 6.2 3.4 6.5 0.0 .169 2.23 10 8
Wing e/d 8.2 1.8 20.8 0.0 .243 .132 6 1
Fus e/d 4.9 2.8 11.8 0.0 .240 .136 4 2
Pyln e/d 6.9 2.3 13.7 0.0 .193 .410 4 2
Trtal 78 43
.Spares _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Tot Cost $6.2 3,1
(S Mil) __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
The analysis used the ASO sparing model discussed in the last chapter to
calculate the change in AVCAL spares that resulted from the combination of these three
factors. The fifth column shows AVCAL spares quantities by WRA using IAFTA and
ATS, and totals the quantities and spares costs at the bottom. To support 14 F-18 aircraft
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aboard a carrier, cost of spares for the 14 WRAs tested on IAFTA dropped by 50%, from
$6.2 million to $3.1 million.
In analyzing these results to make predictions about the performance CASS
will achieve, several points must be considered. First, the study controlled for variables
such as LDT, which may substantially affect TAT, but did not break out PRT or EMT
as separate measures. As a result it is difficult to specify all the causes of the 50%
reduction in TAT. Differences in reliability and maintainability of LAFTA and ATS may
have contributed to the change (although the BCM rate reduction can be tied directly to
the functional test strategy since no other variables are likely to affect it). Second, it is
not clear that these results can be extrapolated to predict results for the whole range of
WRAs and SRAs that CASS will test. These may have BIT capabilities and levels of
complexity that vary substantially from the 14 F-18 WRAs.
Despite these questions which cloud the analysis, this study leads to the
conclusion that using a functional test strategy with CASS is likely to reduce TAT, BCM
rate and cost of weapon system spares for at least some complex UUTs or those with
extensive BIT circuits.
2. Computer Capability
Improvements in computer capabilities between earlier generations of ATE and
CASS may significantly reduce the time required for several testing and management
functions. These capabilities include significantly expanded computer processing power,
which allows both faster testing and simultaneous performance of several operator
controlled tasks, and management tools never before available, such as the OMS and
IMOMS systems.
The influence of computer processing power on testing time is shown through
comparison of VAST and RADCOM. While the shift to a software orientation in test
programs between VAST development in the late 1960s and RADCOM in the late 1970s
greatly improved the ease with which programs can be updated, PRT increased for many
UUTs. For example, the PRT for the E-2C main display unit (MDU) averaged 20
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minutes on VAST, but 45 minutes on RADCOM. One reason for this is that RADCOM
digital analysis is performed by the station computer, which consequently becomes easily
bogged down and cannot perform any other task at the same time. VAST, by contrast,
performs most digital analysis within its digital sub-system, freeing its station computer
for overall test control. The resulting difference in computer speed may become
significant in terms of EMT when a complete test or portion of a test must be repeated
numerous times during on-line WRA repair (using the process illustrated by the flow
chart in the last chapter). [Ref. 32]
CASS, like VAST, frees its station computer for overall test control by
incorporating the series of microprocessor sub-systems known as asset controllers. CASS
also benefits from advances during the 1980s in computer and communications
technology, including faster computer chips, increased memory and the internal and
external ethernet. These improvements give CASS processing power which will allow
many simultaneous computer controlled functions.
The CASS operator directs these functions through a 'multi-tasking windows
interface' rather than the 'single-tasking test based interface' used in earlier systems.
[Ref. 31 ] A multi-tasking interface may increase station utilization by moving many UUT
setup and teardown functions from internal (performed with the station idle) to external,
which may keep the station engaged in actual testing for more of its available operating
time.
This multi-tasking capability may be illustrated by considering a CASS station
with three UUTs to be run. The operator sets up the first UUT and starts its testing, then
enters data for the next UUT. While performing the first test, the station prepares for the
second by calling down the TPS software and maintenance publications from its own
memory or that of another CASS station in the local area network (LAN). As soon as
the first test is complete, it is physically disconnected and the second UUT is connected
and the test is started. The IMOM system automatically collects and stores test data on
the first UUT, which the operator can then enter on the paper maintenance action form,
type it into the NALCOMIS terminal, or uplink it in electronic form to NALCOMIS.
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While performing these tasks, the station can prepare for testing the third UUT. When
there are more than three UUTs to be run, the station and operator may engage in a
continuous process of simultaneous pre-test, test and post-test operations. [Ref. 19]
While performing the testing and data management functions for the three
UUTs, the computer may also be used for embedded training of technicians, self-
calibration using built-in standards, and continuous, automatic self testing/diagnostics.
Together, these automated systems are likely to reduce EMT by increasing operator
efficiency and capability during testing.
Finally, the IMOMS and OMS systems together have the capability to make
AIMDs of the future fully automated avionic repair facilities. If the OMS network of
CASS stations is linked to a minicomputer in production control (either using
NALCOMIS or a specialized ATE network computer able to provide software storage and
a communication node), the ATE shop supervisor or production chief may determine in
real time or by a report: [Ref. 19]
" The availability rate and fault/calibration status of every station and TPS.
" CASS station utilization rates, for use in distributing workload.
" The status of any in-work UUT.
" Details of repair actions, PRT and EMT of any UUT or type of UUT from a library
of test logs within tie OMS data base management system.
" Which stations are most efficient at running a particular type of UUT.
These management tools may substantially increase the efficiency and
flexibility of CASS production managers in responding to increased operating tempo or
to unexpectedly large volumes of UUTs inducted into some shops (while leaving others
idle). In contrast to existing systems which have little such surge flexibility and
consequently often have large backlogs and long TATs, the transportability of TPSs
across a CASS network managed using the IMOMS and OMS systems allows workload




Supportability is the degree to which an ATE system can be supported, in
terms of characteristics of the prime test equipment, such as reliability and
maintainability, and the effectiveness of the elements of its logistic support.
[Ref. 34:p. 16] Because the majority of the problems identified in the
Marcy Report concern supportability issues, supportability became a cornerstone of CASS.
The first Navy ATE system to fully benefit from the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA)
process, CASS was developed with heavy emphasis on both the iterative process of
designing for supportability from the earliest stages of the program, and on delivery of
total organic support by the IOC date. This section will evaluate the likely results of that
emphasis in terms of reducing TAT.
ATE and TPS supportability affect repair TAT in two ways. First, the
reliability and self-test capability designed into the ATE system affects EMT because, to
complete a test, operators must fault isolate not only the UUT but any station and TPS
failures that occur. Second, ATE reliability, maintainability and logistic support affect
ATE system availability, which influences UUT backlog and the LDT portion of TAT.
The following paragraphs analyze these two effects.
a. Supporfbhility Effects on EMT
CASS may significantly reduce EMT in comparison to existing testers
because of its continuous on-line self test capability. Members of the FOT have only off-
line self test programs used during start-up or when a problem is suspected, and generally
have limited TPS fault detection capability. The significance of this difference is clarified
by recalling the description of current ATE/TPS troubleshooting practices presented in the
last chapter.
When replacing an SRA does not fix a UUT failure identified by a test
program, the operator must determine whether the problem is in the UUT (perhaps in the
wiring rather than an SRA), the TPS or the ATE. Often this requires extensive manual
troubleshooting which is very dependent upon availability of ATE and U1JTs for sub-
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stitution, operator skills and the adequacy of maintenance manuals. Increased reliability
of ATE and TPS will reduce the frequency of this testing interruption while self-testing
capability improvements may reduce their length.
An example of the impact of supportability factors on EMT is illustrated
by Table IV, which shows that EMT increased for several high failure rate E-2C
components when they were offloaded from VAST to RADCOM at NAS Norfolk AIMD.
[Ref. 32] For example, EMT for the HARS-SDC (a signal data converter) tripled,
increasing from 8.1 hours on VAST to 24.4 hours on RADCOM (three full shifts of
station time).
Table IV. Comparison of VAST and RADCOM EMT.
WRA VAST RADCOM Change
Nomenclature EMT Hrs EMT Hrs Factor
MDU 5.4 7.5 1.4
HARS-SDC 8.1 24.4 3.0
UMD 2.1 11.4 5.4
ADC 5.5 9.8 1.8
Differences in test programs cannot account for the large increases in
EMT because RADCOM TPSs are virtually identical to those for VAST. Nor are
differences due to computer speed because, although PRT increased between VAST and
RADCOM for some UUTs, these increases are measured in minutes while EMT increases
are measured in hours. For example, the PRT of the E-2C main display unit (MDU)
shown in Table III increased from 20 to 45 minutes when it transitioned from VAST to
RADCOM support. (PRT did not increase by a consistent percentage for all UUTs,
however.) [Ref. 32] Such PRT increases may have a multiplied effect on EMT when
all or part of the program must be repeated several times during sequential replacement
of SRAs. However, the single most important factor in the dramatic increases in EMT
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was lack of TPS supplementary data needed by the operator to discriminate between ATE,
TPS and UUT faults, and then isolate and repair them. Such documentation was available
for VAST TPSs but was not delivered for RADCOM TPSs until several years after their
introduction to the fleet (after the data in Table III was collected). [Ref. 32]
CASS should have improved ability to discriminate between station, TPS
and UUT faults, resulting in decreased EMT for the same UUTs. It is designed and
warranted to continuously monitor station and TPS inteiface status and automatically
indicate all faults to the operator, detecting 100% of the faults within five minutes and
isolating them to a single CASS SRA within 15 minutes 95% of the time (as detailed in
Chapter III). As soon as a CASS fault is detected that affects the particular test being
performed, the operator may disconnect the set up and move to an 'up' station, with no
additional on-line troubleshooting required.
However, TPS troubleshooting time has historically been a large
contributor to EMT [Ref. 32], and may continue to be a problem using CASS, depending
on the comprehensiveness of TPS self-test capability and supplementary data. CASS
TPSs are likely to be more reliable and maintainable than existing TPS for the same UUT
because all needed instruments are intended to be inside the station, enabling use of
simple passive IDs, perhaps containing only a junction box and cables. But there are
already many known exceptions to use of passive IDs. For example, CASS will require
a 'power head' (an active ID with a high frequency signal processor) for UUTs needing
radio frequencies above 40 Ghz because it was technically impractical to put these
instruments in the station. [Ref. 35] Many digital WRAs will require IDs
containing digital multiplexers while many electro-optical, pneumatic and radar UUTs will
require IDs with liquid coolant and extensive mechanical devices. Designing
comprehensive self-testing capability into such IDs may be prohibitively expensive.
Some individuals involved in TPS development believe that TPS
performance, reliability and maintainability goals are not affordable for a large percentage
of TPSs. [Ref. 31 ] NAVAIR considers TPS development an area of high risk which they
are attempting to control through development of a standard TPS contracting vehicle to
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be used for each of the thousands of TPS to be developed. The technical approach to
TPS acquisition now being considered by a 'Red Team' of NAVAIR and field activity
personnel emphasizes performance specifications calling for 100% fault detection and
isolation to an ambiguity group of six, 95% fault isolation to an ambiguity group of two,
an MTBF of 2500 hours anid MTTR of 60 minutes, plus a tradeoff analysis to optimize
TPS cost, ID complexity and PRT. These goals have been achieved for already
developed support of support (SOS) TPS for CASS station components. [Ref. 50]
Another critical factor affecting TPS reliability and maintainability is the
way TPS developers deal with new instrumentation requirements for emerging weapon
systems. If CASS does not contain all needed instruments, they may be added to the
station through engineering change proposals (ECPs) or pre-planned product improvement
(P3)I, or they may be placed in active IDs for the UUTs that need the function. Many
existing ATE systems have been upgraded to accept new testing requirements using active
IDs rather than station modifications because it is often cheaper and more manageable in
terms of configuration control. Similar reasoning by decision makers involved in CASS
TPS development could lead eventually to fielding of many complex IDs to support new
weapon systems.
Consideration of each of these factors leads to the conclusions that CASS
station self-testing capability will tend to reduce EMT overall, but the EMT of each UUT
will be highly dependent upon the tradeoffs made during TPS development between cost
and TPS performance, reliability, maintainability and self-testability.
b. ATE Availability Effects on TAT
Operational availability (A,) is the probability that a system, when used
under stated conditions in an actual operational environment, will operate satisfactorily
when called upon. [Ref. 34:p. 65] ATE operational availability affects the LDT portion
of TAT through its effect on backlog.
A study by the Center for Naval Analysis demonstrated this relationship
between operational availability and TAT (given a constant number of ATE stations at
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a site) for four ATE stations: VAST, the Avionics Test Set (ATS), the Hybrid Test Set
(HTS) and CAT HID. The study compared the actual ATE availability and repair TAT
achieved by these stations during a 1987 USS Constellation deployment to the TAT that
would have been achieved given 100% ATE availability. The likely effects of 100%
ATE availability on queue length and TAT were determined using a queuing simulation
called the Aviation Logistics Model (ALM) developed by CNA. [Ref. 29]
The study found that the actual average TAT for VAST was 9.7 days, but
fell to 7.1 days when the station was assumed to be always available. For ATS it fell
from 4.8 days actual average TAT to 4.0 days assuming 100% availability. Using ASO
manual rules, the shorter TAT reduced the cost of AVCAL spares allowances by 7.9%
for VAST and 11% for ATS. TAT and sparing differences turned out to be slight for
HTS and CAT IIID, probably because they had greater excess capacity than VAST and
ATS and so were less sensitive to changes in availability.
It is important to note that even very low levels of ATE availability may
have little effect on TAT if a site has sufficient stations to compensate for it. For this
reason, if all else is held constant, improving ATE A0 will either reduce the number of
stations required or reduce TAT, as in the above study. (The workload model used to
compute station requirements at a site based on a given A and other key input variables
is considered in the next section.)
To make comparison of A0 for CASS and FOT meaningful, common
assumptions and methodology must be used in the A. calculation. The following
paragraphs establish this common base and then compare the computed values of A. for
CASS versus three members of the FOT.
A critical assumption in calculating A0 is what constitutes a 'down'
station. The CNA study reported above avoided this definition problem by using
documented downtime of individual components of each station rather than A. of the
entire station. Different UUTs require different station 'building blocks;' some
components are core requirements needed for testing all UUTs, but others are requ"ed
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for only a few UUTs. A further complication is that a station component may be partially
down, but can still be used to test a subset of UUTs.
To overcome these problems, the CASS development specification for A.
is based on the assumption that any failure downs the entire station. Much less
conservative (and difficult to compare) assumptions are commonly used in calculating Ao
for members of the FOT, resulting in published values close to 0.90. [Ref. 36]
The 1984 NAVAIR methodology used for calculating the targeted CASS A was based
on the standard Navy policy for calculating the A of weapon and support systems.
[Ref. 37] It used the following equation: [Ref. 38]
A.= MTBF * k
(MTBF * k) + MDT
and k =T,
To
where T, = Period of calendar time over which A. of the system
is to be measured;
T= Operating time of the system during T,;
and MDT. = Mean unscheduled downtime (ignoring scheduled maintenance);
= M'lTR + MLDT + MDT,;
M'ITR = Mean time to repair;
MLDT = Mean logistic delay time;
MDT. = Mean downtime for other delays (outside assistance,
training, documentation, etc.).
CASS used 1984 VAST data as the baseline for estimating many of these
values. The k factor is introduced in this methodology to convert MTBF (which assumes
continuous operating time except during repair) into units of continuous elapsed calendar
time (which includes those time periods when the system is not operating and, therefore,
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will not fail) so that all elements of the equation will be in common units. If the station
is always in active use, k is equal to 1. However, when there are long periods of station
inactivity (because the ATE shop does not work around the clock) k is greater than 1.
It equals the ratio of Tjro which represents the calendar time to operating time
relationship over the long run to account for all active and inactive phases. [Ref. 37:p.
A-13] The weighted average actual operating time (T.) for all VAST sites in 1984 was
343.5 hours/station/month (out of 720 total calendar hours/month). The k factor for
VAST (and assumed for CASS) is therefore:
k = T = 720 hours/station/month- = 2.096.
TO 343.5 hours/station/month
MLDT for VAST was 80.9 hours. To account for the initial supply
system learning curve that will probably increase the CASS MLDT, NAVAIR increased
this valuke by 50%, to 120 hours.
The CASS reliability and maintainability specification values given in
Chapt'r HlI are derived from inherent, or laboratory, values which were derated to reflect
operational values expected to be achieved during initial fleet introduction. A reliability
derating factor of 2.7 was chosen on the basis of a Rome Air Development Center study
of avionic systems which determined the typical ratios of MTBF/MTBF are between 2.5
and 2.7. MTTR was doubled to account for the initial maintenance learning curve. If the
follow -ig terms are defined:
MTBF, = inherent MTBF;
MTBFo = operational MTBF;
MTTRi = inherent MTTR;
MTI'R0 = operational MTTR;
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then
MTBFo = MTBFI = 400 hours = 148 hours;
2.7 2.7
MTrRQ = MT'1T * 2 = 1 hour * 2 = 2 hours.
Using an assumed value for MDT. of 10 hours, CASS A. is calculated
as follows:
A = MTBF * k
(MTBF * k) + M'TRo + MLDT + MDT,
(148 * 2.096) = 0.70.
(148 * 2.096) + 2 + 120 +10
Sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the three principal drivers of A. are
T., MLDT and MTBF; a 10% change in any of one these parameters (up or down) results
in only a 3% change in A,. This is an indication of the sensitivity of the results to errors
in estimating the input values. It is notable that A. is not overly sensitive to small errors
in individual input values, but even small errors in multiple input values are cumulative
and can strongly affect the A. prediction.
NAVAIR lowered the contractual value for Ao from 0.70 to 0.68 because
the latter is the CNO goal for weapon system availability. To provide adequate support
for these weapon systems CASS should be able to achieve at least this level of
availability. [Ref. 39]
Table V shows the estimated A. and its components for CASS VAST,
CAT HID and RADCOM calculated using the above methodology. A value for k of
2.096 and MDT. of 10 hours was assumed for all four ATE systems. All other FOT
input data was obtained from the Naval Air Engineering Center which compiled it by
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validating and cleaning up the notoriously inaccurate 3M data base. They used a
representative sample of stations from sea and shore sites, including 31 VAST stations,
16 RADCOMs, and 19 CAT IflDs, for the period April 1985 to February 1990. (Note
that the data for VAST in Table V differs from the 1984 VAST data used in the above
analysis.) (Ref. 40]
Table V. Comparison of A for CASS vs Members of the Family of Testers.
Parameter VAST CAT ID RADCOM CASS
MTBF 122 457 341 148
MTR 1.782 6.92 7.917 2.0
MLDT 200 655 744 120
MDTo  10 10 10 10
A0  .547 .588 484 .70
(All tunes are given in hours)
The comparison indicates that if NAVAIR assumptions are correct, upon
initial fleet introduction CASS may be less reliable than RADCOM and CAT IUD, but
more reliable than VAST (indicated by MTBF for each system). Its reliability is expected
to grow during its initial 'bum-in' period, however. CASS may be far more maintainable
than RADCOM and CAT HID and about the same as VAST (indicated by MTTR).
Overall, CASS A is significantly higher than the A. of the three FOT stations, given the
assumptions discussed above.
The CASS assumption for MLDT of 120 hours is most open to challenge.
It is much lower than the MLDT for any of the FOT systems, even though CASS must
use the same supply system and faces many of the same logistic delays. If the CAT IHID
MLDT value of 655 hours is substituted in the equation for the assumed CASS MLDT
of 120 hours, CASS A. drops from 0.70 to 0.317. Even using the current VAST MLDT
(which at 200 hours is significantly better than CAT ID MLDT) the CASS A0 would
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be 0.59, which is only a slightly higher value for A than the three FOT systems. The
conclusion drawn from this comparison is that CASS availability will not be better than
the availability of existing ATE unless its MLDT is significantly lower than that of the
three FOT systems.
c. Influences on ATE Supportability
RADCOM and CAT HID have much higher M'ITR and MLDT than
VAST because changes in the architecture of these newer testers limit their ability to be
organically repaired and spares allowances have not adequately covered the long TAT for
commercial depot repair.
The architectural approach used in most ATE developed since VAST
employs predominately off-the-shelf (non-developmental) hardware to 'rack and stack'
the needed functional components. As much as 80% of the circuitry is typically made
up of embedded commercial test equipment (CTE). Testers may be assembled from
different combinations of about 40 standard commercial instruments (such as RF
generators, vector voltmeters and signal analyzers) to provide input signals and response
measurement. These are joined with a station computer, software and a small set of
contractor developed equipment (CDE) to provide power and functions such as interface
with the ID and the operator. [Ref. 13:p. 5-6]
The advantages of an ATE acquisition strategy emphasizing CTE are that
it is the fastest way to build test equipment and it has low up front costs and
technical/schedule risks compared to using CDE as was the case in the older VAST.
Most CTE have proven high levels of reliability in commercial applications and most
have performed similarly well in ATE, as reflected in the relatively high levels of
reliability of RADCOM and CAT HID shown above.
This acquisition strategy causes many supportability problems, however,
including reliance on primarily non-organic depot maintenance and short obsolescence
cycles. The phased support concept has also induced supportability problems during
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introduction of new ATE. The following paragraphs explain these problems and comp&.!
the alternative approaches used in CASS development.
Intermediate level maintenance support for testers employing CTE is very
limited because NAVAIR policy restricts maintenance of all embedded CTE to depot
repair activities. This decision was made in 1987 in an effort to improve configuration
control of commercial instrumetits. CTE manufacturers continually update their products
by discontinuing product lines (and their repair parts) and by making frequent design
changes in current production instruments to improve them and keep up with state of the
art. While many companies such as Hewlett Packard (used extensively in ATE) pledge
to support their product for seven years, it is nonetheless difficult for Navy repair sites
to maintain the right spare parts and publications, especially at intermediate level.
[Ref. 41]
Despite this policy, experienced I level maintenance technicians or
technical representatives often perform needed repairs to CTE. When they cannot,
technicians must ship the CTE to the depot even when only minor adjustments are
required. This has seriously affected RADCOM and CAT ID MLDT and availability.
Due to a commercial depot repair backlog approaching two years for the CTE in these
testers, there were over 600 parts awaiting induction by Grumman as of 23 January 1990.
[Ref. 42] Of these, 119 were holding stations down. Much of this delay arose during the
transition from prime contractor support by Grumman to Navy support after MSD in
1988, which occurred without adequate spares on hand to meet the demand. A snapshot
of the resulting Atlantic fleet ATE status on 26 January 1990 reveals that 9 of 25
RADCOM stations and 8 of 27 CAT HID stations were down for parts ordered from off
the ship or station. With one third of fleet RADCOM/CAT ID assets typically down
(as on this day), type commanders have kept deployed carrier ATE stations up by
cannibalizing station parts from shore AIMDs and pierside carriers. [Ref. 431
The short obsolescence cycles of CTE (averaging seven to fourteen years)
also creates ATE supportability problems. Because the government generally does not
buy level Il engineering drawings for these instruments, spare parts procurement becomes
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costly after the contractor stops supporting them. For example, 29 repairable RADCOM
circuit cards made by HP are currently obsolete and must be reprocured in FY-91 from
other sources using inadequate level 1 drawings. These parts will require significant
reverse engineering to attain the same form, fit and function as the original parts. The
redesign may also significantly change their repair processes. [Ref. 44]
Use of phased support plans is at the root of many supportability
problems associated with the introduction of new ATE systems. For example, the
RADCOM IOC date was September 1982 and the introduction is now almost complete,
yet many RADCOM publications were not ordered from Grumman until 1986 and many
have not been delivered. [Ref. 44] Maintenance Assist Modules (MAMS) needed for
station troubleshooting were not delivered until 1988. Many operator and maintainer
courses were overloaded until 1989 so, until recently, less than half of the RADCOM
operators at many shore sites were formally trained. Sea and shore AIMDs experienced
significant problems supporting their stations (reflected in the MTR, MLDT and A. data
above) during the several years' wait for the logistic 'tail' to catch up.
The negative consequences of a phased support concept include: [Ref.
11]
* ATE systems must often be nurtured and micro-managed until all logistic elements
are in place.
• Support of ATE cannot be tested during development, so poor design for logistic
supportability may be discovered only by fleet users.
" Few incentives exist for the contractor to design for minimum life cycle cost and
adequately perform logistic support analysis (LSA).
• Few incentives exist to pay for a logistic support tail once a system is operating
because ATE deficiencies can be compensated for by higher expenditures for
weapon system spares and depot repairs (which may increase total life cycle costs).
CASS is likely to eliminate most of these supportability problems
affecting existing ATE systems for a number of reasons. Most "mportantly, CASS will
have no phased support. All logistic elements including spares are under development
concurrently with the prime equipment, will be provided organically, will be delivered up
front, and will be tested during TECHEVAL and OPEVAL. Second, maintainability will
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be improved by the high degree of commonality between tester configurations and by the
'function on a card' approach that eliminates most CTE instruments. It should have faster
repairs due to its extensive self-testability, modularity, automated technical information
system and embedded training capability. The MTrR is warranted not to exceed 2.0
hours, compared to the 6.9 and 7.8 hours for CAT 11M and RADCOM. It has a power
conditioning system and battery backup sufficient to overcome many of the reliability
problems experienced by current testers due to power transients.
There are, however, several areas of technical risk that could impact
supportability. Perhaps the most significant is the high forced air cooling requirement of
CASS which exceeds the current capabilities of carriers to provide. An adequate and
reliable cooling system is of vital importance to ensure CASS is more supportable than
existing systems. The current plan to solve this problem is to deliver a portable air chiller
along with each CASS station. This chiller will require a water line. power and an
additional four square feet of deck space. [Ref. 35] The supportability issues are, first,
that the chiller must also have organic logistic support, and second, that because it will
form a series system with CASS it will reduce total reliability of the test system by a
factor equal to the chiller's reliability. The chiller may be more reliable than facility air
conditioning on which ATE now depends, but it is sure to increase CASS' demand for
electrical power which is constrained by the inability of ships to meet ever growing
requirements. The significance of these power and air problems is illustrated by a recent
Coral Sea cruise in vhich RADCOM technicians reported an average of 1.6 hours down
each day due to facility power and cooling problems. [Ref. 45]
In the event that CASS overheats, among the first components likely to
be damaged is the RF subsystem, which contains the few items of C E in CASS (other
than the VAX computer). They will not be organically supported, and the govemment
has no level III drawings. They are an improvement over present CTE in terms of
supportability, however, because they are modular cards rather than complete instruments
and the manufacturer (HP) has contracted to provide support for 20 years. [Ref. 351
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The key to reducing MLDT from the 600+ hours experienced by
RADCOM and CAT IUD to the 120 hours targeted for CASS is to have up front delivery
of organic intermediate and depot level support. This will significantly reduce the repair
TAT of CASS SRAs in comparison to the TAT of SRAs for non-organically supported
testers. Adequate spares must also be stocked. To achieve the CASS goal for A of 0.68,
NAVAIR has therefore set the policy that A, will drive CASS SRA sparing. The
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) will use a 'readiness based sparing model' known as
'ARROWS' to compute AVCAL/SHORECAL allowances for a site. CASS is the first
support equipment system to use this model (until now ARROWS has been used only for
weapon systems). If it works as intended, sufficient spares will be stocked to achieve the
targeted A. value of 0.68 given CASS' forecast reliability. [Ref. 39]
A fundamental problem remains unsolved, however, because there is still
no adequate measure of availability that accounts for partially capable CASS stations that
can test some UUTs and not others. Achieving an A. of 0.68 does not mean the station
has a 68% probability of being able to perform satisfactorily when called upon. Because
NAVAIR assumes that any fault (however minor) downs the station, its probability of
being able to perform satisfactorily (able to test some but not all UUTs) may be
considerably higher than its measured value of A0.
4. Workload Analysis
The number and type of ATE stations delivered to a site are the final key
determinate of TAT. Providing too few ATE stations to a site results in unplanned levels
of backlog (which is a principal cause of weapon system LDT) and drives up
AVCAL/SHORECAL allowances. An accurate workload model, on the other hand,
facilitates tradeoff analysis between cost of ATE and cost of weapon system spares to
achieve a given level of customer service and enables decision makers to compensate for
low ATE A or long EMT of individual UUTs.
72
Inputs which must be considered in workload analysis include:
* UUT induction rates;
" EMT of each UUT;
* Facility operating hours;
" Station Ao;
• Desired ATE utilization rate;
* Desired level of customer service;
* Queue discipline;
To adequately account for these factors in determining the correct number of
stations to install at a site, a queuing simulation should be used. The CASS System
Synthesis Model (SSM) contains such a model (as discussed in Chapter II) but it is still
under development. Once accepted by the government from GE it will be used to
compute CASS station requirements at each site. Station requirements up until now have
been computed with a linear algebraic workload model which uses average values for
inherently random parameters such as EMT and UUT inductions. It attempts to account
for the effects on a repair queue of random surges in UUT inductions and variations in
EMT by setting the CASS station utilization to some value less than one.
[Ref. 46] A similar model has been used for determining requirements for
earlier ATE systems without benefit of a far more accurate queuing simulation (as CASS
should eventually have). As a result, too few ATE stations have been procured for many
members of the FOT to achieve the desired level of customer service or minimize total
weapon system support costs. The early problems with VAST workload are a typical
example of this, as discussed in the summary of ATE evolution in Chapter II. RADCOM
is another example, as will be demonstrated below.
This section compares two studies of RADCOM workload to illustrate the
effects of different assumptions and input values on the linear algebraic model's
calculation of the number of stations required. It also indicates the degree of risk the
CASS introduction team faces as they forecast CASS station requirements using this
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model and predicted input values. The CASS SSM model is reviewed in more detail at
the end of this section.
The basic linear algebraic model used for RADCOM workload analysis is as
follows:
Stations required = TOT WKLD HRS REQ;
StAV
TOT WKLD HRS REQ = WKLD/M summed over all UUT in each aircraft,
for each site;
WKLD/Mj = PFH/M, * WKLD/FLTI-I,;
StAV = SLF * Ao *HRWD * DPM;
where
TOT WKLD HRS REQ = Total expected workload hours required per
month for the site;
WKLD/MJ = Expected workload/month for the i 'h aircraft
and the jth UUT;
PFH/M = Peak flight hours/month (highest flight hours
expected in any month) for the ith aircraft;
WKLD/FLTKJ = Total expected workload/flight hour for the
i' aircraft and jh L-1 IT;
StAV = Station availability;
SLF = Surge loading factor;
HRWD = Hours of work/day;
DPM = Days/month.
WKLD/FLTH is a unitless value calculated as the sum of EMT/MTBF for each
UUTj in each aircraft, to be tested on the ATE system. For example, the radar data
converter for the A-6E aircraft has an MTBF of 39 hours and EMT of 4.19 hours.
WKLD/FLTH for this WRA is thu, " '9/39, or 0.10743. [Ref. 471 This value
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is computed for the remained ATE-supported A-6E UUTs to obtain a total A-6E
WKLD/FLTH. This is added to the totals computed similarly for the other aircraft types
to obtain the overall WKLD/FLTH for the site.
The surge loading factor is equivalent to the desired station utilization rate.
It is less than 1.0 to protect against surges in operating tempo and the effects of
randomness in the distributions of inductions and EMT which could cause undesired
levels of backlog if a station is loaded to full capacity.
This model was used in RADCOM workload studies conducted by the Pacific
Missile Test Center (PMTC) [Ref. 47] and by Grumman Aerospace Corporation (under
NAVAIR contract). [Ref. 48] It is also the basis for the workload module of
the CASS SSM developed for NAVAIR by General Electric. Although the three
organizations called some of the variables by different names, the models they used are
all essentially as shown above (which is based on the PMTC study). The following
paragraphs compare the results and input values of the 1985 Grumman study (which
considered E-2C RADCOM support requirements) and the 1989 PMTC study of the full
RADCJM workload.
The Grumman study underestimated EMT and overestimated station A. in
p--:-cting site requirements for RADCOM stations to support the E-2C. PMTC
determined that 150 RADCOM stations are needed Navy wide, compared to the 122 that
were procured based on this Grumman analysis (as well as other similar Grumman studies
of RADCOM quantities needed to support the A-6E and EA-6B). Even before the PMTC
study, NAVAIR (ALR-552) recognized that the first calculation of site requirements was
too low and in 1986 delivered an extra station for many sea and shore AIMDs. [Ref. 43]
In 1988 COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC urged that quantities be further
increased above planned deliveries in order to reduce backlog, recommending quantities
at major sea -"nd shorc ALRMDs very close to PMTC's later calculations. [Ref. 43]
Grumman determined the values of EMT for each UUT based on 1981-1982
3M data compiled very early in the RADCOM program. EMT for new UUTs never
before supported were based on estimates by systems engineers, using the relative
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complexity of components and comparisons to similar systems. The EMT values for
UUTs offloaded from VAST were reduced by 20% based on the expectation that
RADCOM would reduce VAST EMT by that amount (an expectation which was not
realized, as shown by the comparison of VAST and RADCOM EMT earlier in this
chapter). From these EMT values the study calculated a mean station workload/flight
hour (WKLD/FLTH) of 0.619 using the method shown above.
PMTC recalculated this value and found it to be 0.99884 after RADCOM had
been in the fleet for several years and more accurate and complete 3M data on EMT was
available. The increase in station WKLD/FLTH, with everything else held constant,
results in a 61% increase in RADCOM station requirements to support the E-2C aircraft.
The Grumman overestimate of RADCOM A (contained in the denominator
of the above equation) appears in a factor they called "workload efficiency," which is
equivalent to the portion of the model PMTC labeled "A * SLF." Whereas Grumman
used 0.8 for this value, PMTC calculated the value based on a more complex analysis
which used the values of A. and SLF for various types of sites. These values are shown
in Table VI.
The A, values of 0.746, 0.777 and .842 for carriers, shore AIMDs and depots,
respectively, were computed from 3M data. The SLF values were derived from a
multiple server queuing model that attempted to account for the varying levels of surge
protection needed at sites with different numbers of ATE stations to achieve the same
level of customer service. Queuing theory predicts that at a site with two stations, ULITs
will have a significantly lower waiting time to be serviced than if there is one station,
while each additional station installed at the site reduces waiting time by an ever
decreasing amount. PMTC made a 'first pass' estimate of station requirements for each
site and used these values in the queuing analysis to compute the SLF. For example,
large shore AIMDs (such as AIMD Oceana) which are assumed to need four RADCOM
stations have an SLF equal to 0.78. Shore AIMDs assumed to need only two stations to
support their smaller workload need greater surge protection; their SLF therefore drops
to 0.72. The workload efficiency for a large shore AIMD is thus computed as:
76
Table VI. PMTC Calculation of RADCOM Workload Efficiency.
SLF Wokload
Type of Station A. (from Efficiency
Site Qty Station ::'.*(A,::::::::::: *: SLF)
Carrier AIMD 4 .746 .78 .58
Shore AIMD 4 .777 .78 56
Shore AIMD 1 .777 .62 .48
Depot 2 .842 .72 .61
Depot 1 .842 .62 .52
Workload Efficiency = A. * SLF
= 0.777 * 0.78 = 0.56.
The workload efficiency factor for the other types of sites were computed similarly. This
process is iterative because the quantity of stations finally calculated using the model
must be the same as the first pass estimate that feeds into it.
It is not at all clear what the 'correct' value is for A given the difficulties in
defining its meaning, but the PMTC results (based on the higher EMT and lower values
for A. * SLF) come nearer to reflecting actual station quantity requirements. The model
is very sensitive not only to errors in predicting values such as A. and EMT, but to
assumptions concerning the surge loading factor and number of hours worked per day.
When PMTC recalculated total station requirements using a surge loading factor of 1.0
(100% utilization) for all sites, total RADCOM station requirements dropped from 150
to 125. This quantity is not significantly higher than the 122 that were actually procured.
Station requirements dropped from 150 to 127 when PMTC assumed that all AIMDs work
24 hours per day rather than the more typical 16 hour workday ashore and 24 hour
workday at sea.
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The Naval Air Engineering Center, which manages the CASS SSM model,
confirmed the sensitivity of their version of the model to EMT, A. and surge loading
factor. They ran a sensitivity analysis of the workload model of the CASS SSM at the
author's request for this thesis research, using assumed input values and six hypothetical
UUTs. The results show that doubling the average EMT doubles the quantity of stations
required at a site. An 18% decrease in either A or the surge loading factor (which the
SSM calls "desired station utilization") produce 18% increases in the number of stations
required. Thus it is simple to predict changes in this algebraic model output as inputs are
varied because they are linearly related. They are not so simply related in a queuing
model. [Ref. 49]
These relationships demonstrate the implications of errors in assumptions and
predictions for the CASS introduction. If too few CASS stations are initially delivered
to handle the assigned testing load, as occurred in both the RADCOM and VAST
programs, the results may be unplanned backlogs, a reduction in the level of customer
service provided by the AVCAL/SHORECAL (at least temporarily until allowances are
raised), and a disruption of the introduction/transition schedule. [Ref. 50]
This schedule disruption may occur if, first, NAVAIR must redistribute CASS
stations to increase their allowances at critical sites, or second, NAVAIR must retain FOT
testers at some sites as backups to CASS even after their TPSs are offloaded. As an
example of the latter response to overloaded ATE stations, the type commanders and A-6
Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (APML) decided to retain Mini-SACE stations
(used to support the A-6E) aboard some carriers (such as Ranger) as backups after Mini-
SACE UUTs were supposed to have completed transition to RADCOM because there are
not enough RADCOMs in place to handle the full testing load. [Ref. 51] and
[Ref. 52]
The task of estimating CASS station requirements is far more complex than
the introduction of earlier ATE systems because the program has a significantly larger
scope and because the high degree of commonality between CASS stations permits UUTs
to be run on several different station configurations.
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As noted in Chapter III, the SSM was developed to optimize the number and
mix of stations at a particular site, using mapping, workload and simulation models.
Figure 12 shows the process used for determining an optimized site profile using the
model. [Ref. 46] The workload (as shown in the first block) is determined by first
reading from a computer data base the weapon system complement of a site, the WRAs
in each weapon system, and the SRAs in each WRA. Induction rates are calculated using
the quantity and MTBF of each WRA/SRA and the appropriate weapon system planning
documents (WSPDs) containing projected combat/peacetime operational hours per
platform. The output of this process is the potential CASS workload at the site if it is
able to test all WRAs/SRAs. The Mapping model is used to perform UUT-to-station
mapping to indicate which UUTs may be tested by which station configurations (and also
which UUTs cannot be tested by CASS).
The second and remaining steps shown in the figure are performed using the
workload model in conjunction with a linear programming model that considers all
possible UUT to station type assignments and minimizes the unconstrained objective
function:
Z = sum (rank(i) * quantity(i));
where
i = index to each station type required;
rank = user specified desirability rank for each statior configuration;
quantity = number of each station type.
The desirability rank is based on either the relative cost or space requirements
of each station type. For example, the hybrid configuration is the cheapest and the
smallest (because it has no sixth rack), so will have the highest rank (smallest number).
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The minimum quantity of each type required at a site (shown in the second
block of the figure) is computed using the workload model. Inputs include the A. and
desired utilization for each station configuration plus the induction rates and EMT of all
UUTs which can be tested on that station type only. The maximum number of each
station type (shown in the third block) is computed similarly, but considers the induction
rates and EMT of all UUTs that may feasibly be tested on that station type. Table VII
is a hypothetical example of minimum and maximum UUT maps showing three CASS
configurations with different sets of UUTs that may be mapped to them. For example,
the CNI station is the only configuration that will test UUTs 1, 2, and 7 (which sets
minimum CNI station quantities) but it will also test UUTs 4, 5, 6, and 10 (which sets
maximum CNI station quantities if these UUTs are included in its workload). The actual
number of CNI stations placed at a site will be some quantity between these values
determined by the linear programming model.
Table VII. System Synthesis Model Mapping of UUTs to CASS Station
Configurations
CASS UUTs with a Single Total UUTs Mapped to




All possible combinations, or profiles, of station configurations are determined
using this process, including their resulting CASS self-repair SRA inductions. Those
profiles which cannot meet the totd workload requirements (determined by the workload
model) are eliminated from consideration. The linear programming model then calculates
the objective function of each remaining profile, ranks them by their level of merit and
prints them as the final output of the SSM. The profiles with the lowest level of merit
(there will likely be ties) are optimal. [Ref. 46:p. 44]
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The CASS SSM model is still under development and has not been used
extensively for determining site requirements in the initial introduction plan. The queuing
simulation model must ultimately be integrated with the mapping and LP models before
site requirements can be determined with a high degree of confidence in the results. It
will likely be used in place of the linear workload model for determining minimum,
maximum and optimal station profiles following the process shown in Figure 12. The
identities of UUTs to be tested on CASS at each site must also be determined, as well as
accurate values for their EMT. The SSM may be used at the current stage of planning
only for estimating gross station requirements suitable for scheduling funding
requirements.
Until input data is more accurate and the simulation model is ready, NAVAIR
is attempting to err on the side of scheduling too many stations at a site. Nevertheless,
a low initial guess of station requirements made several years ago resulted in inclusion
of too few stations in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and a shortfall in
station procurement funds through FY-94 totaling $543 million. [Ref. 50] To make up
for it, NAVAIR is now considering several plans, including:
• Slipping the transition schedule of selected programs. Many programs that are
critical to the introduction of CASS aboard CVs are protected from slippage,
however, including the offload of existing testers such as VAST, AAM-60 and
HATS (because they must be removed from CVs to make room for CASS), and
emerging systems such as the F-14D and A-12. [Ref. 50]
" Creating a centralized test and integration facility (CTIF) located at one of the
NADEPS, which TPS developers would use for the integration phase of
development instead of using government furnished CASS stations in their own
contractor facilities as originally planned. This is expected to produce a 20%
savings in station quantity requirements, reducing TPS development stations from
51 to 41. [Ref. 53]
The planned operational testing of CASS and all CASS TPSs before fleet
introduction is a critical step in minimizing risk in many aspects of the CASS introduction
plan. TPSs have never before had thorough testing prior to their fleet introduction. [Ref.
251 As a result, fleet users have experienced many problems with the TPS for existing
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ATE systems, such as problems with equipment supportability and software accuracy, and
workload analysis has been conducted using inaccurate EMT and A. values.
Workload analysis is, in the end, the deciding factor on whether or not the
CASS program achieves its goal of 100% improvement in throughput. Decision makers
may opt to abandon this goal, however, if the reduced cost of weapon system spares
resulting from doubling throughput is less than the procurement and support costs of the
CASS stations needed to achieve it. Such economic tradeoff analysis is beyond the scope
of current detailed planning but should be a critical element of future CASS introduction
planning.
It is important to note that CASS will not significantly improve weapon system
readiness or availability even if it does improve throughput by 100%. In the long run,
when ASO rules are used to compute spares allowances, all improvements in CASS TAT
and supportability will be reflected in reduced requirements for weapon system spares.
This reduction in spares will cancel out most improvements in customer support that
result from the introduction of CASS. Because of its flexibility in spreading workload
over many redundant CASS stations, CASS will, however, improve customer support
when there are short run surges in UUT inductions at a site. Present ATE systems, with
only a few stations of each type and no transportability of TPS, only build backlog.
C. PROPOSED METHODS FOR CALCULATING CASS AVAILABILITY
The previous section showed the importance of the measures of CASS availability
for workload analysis and for determining CASS SRA spares allowances using a readiness
based sparing model. Both of these requirements for measures of availability call for a
site-wide computation of average availability. However, there are two significant
problems with using the standard A. formula for ATE in general and for CASS in
particular. These problems are, first, the standard A. formula fails to account for
'partially up' stations that can test some assigned UUTs but not others. If one assumes
that any failure downs the station, the actual probability that CASS can perform its
mission when called upon is underestimated. Second, the problem of measuring CASS
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availability is complicated by the commonality of CASS circuit cards across
configurations and the transportability of CASS TPSs.
For example, assume that a CASS EO station has a fault in a 'core' circuit card that
is not needed to test the EO UUTs (those that are mapped only to the EO configuration)
but causes the station to lose its capability to test some UUTs normally run by the hybrid
station. Should this degradation impact the EO station's measure of availability until it
is repaired? If so, by how much? At what point is the station 'down': when the first
UUT testing capability is lost, or only when there is no redundant capability at the site
to test that UUT? Some UUTs will have many redundant CASS stations able to support
them (so loss of capability in one station may not be a significant problem) while others
will have few or none. Redundant capability among CASS stations causes many complex
interactive effects on site-wide CASS availability that should be considered in workload
analysis and sparing, but are not accounted for in a simple average A computation.
AIMD production managers and aircraft operational decision makers also need a
more meaningful 'snapshot' measure of CASS availability than the standard A. formula
or than a simple labeling of stations as 'up' or 'down,' especially in situations that
demand a realistic understanding of a ship or shore AIMD weapon system support
posture. Managers will be concerned not only with the degree of redundancy if a station
loses the capability to test a particular UUT, but with the expected induction rate of the
UUT. From a readiness perspective, degradation or loss of capability to test a UUT with
a high failure rate is of much greater concern than a UUT that is seldom inducted by the
AIMD.
To better satisfy these diverse requirements for measuring CASS availability (for
planning and for control purposes) the remainder of this section explains a proposal for
alternate methods of computing CASS availability. The first part considers the problem
of establishing adequate control measures of availability and the second part considers the
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problem of finding a planning measure useful for workload analysis and sparing. The
CASS OMS system should be capable of providing input data for the calculations. These
proposals are based on interviews with and notes from Professor T. P. Moore.
[Ref. 54]
1. Measures of Effectiveness for Control Purposes
Two MOEs for management control are proposed. The first is a point
availability measure labeled A. Its purpose is to provide a snapshot of the overall
availability of the CASS station repair capacity (weighted by demand repair rates) at the
shore or carrier AIMD. The purpose of the second, labeled AM, is to provide a snapshot
of the worst (minimum) UUT repair capability at the site to indentify where the most
degraded capability lies.
a. Point Availability (44p)
AP is computed by the following equation:





= Failure rate of the i'h UUT for the given deckload and
flying hour program;
x1 = Number of CASS stations able to repair the ib' UUT
at the time of the snapshot;
n = Number of CASS stations able to repair the i' UUT if all functions are
'up' on all stations that are supposed to have repair capability for this
UUT (deteimined by the SSM mapping model);
m = Number of types of UUTs.
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The value x/n represents, for the i h UUT, the fraction of the AIMD's
intended repair capability that is available. The ^4's can be viewed as weights in the Ap
computation (i.e., AP is a weighted average of the x,/r values). The sum of the 1 's in
the denominator is the normalization factor which makes the weights sum to 1. The
weights give greater emphasis to the status of CASS repair capability for UUTs that fail
more often.
Thus AP is a function of the status of the CASS station functional
capabilities, the aircraft deckload and the operating tempo.
b. Minimum Availability (AM)
There are two approaches to this 'snapshot' measure. The first is to
compute it as follows:
xl I 12 X3 Xim
This simply identifies the U'JT type with the worst case status in terms
of the fraction of its intended CASS repair capability that is actually available.
The second approach is to combine the first idea with the 'importance'
of the need to repair a UUT provided by the k's. In this case, AM is computed as
follows:
Am = max { x (1 - f.-) Ifo r all i = 1, ..., m
'Ii
Note that (1 - x4 ln) is the unavailable fraction of the repair capacity for
UUT,. If duplicate TPSs for certain high failure rate ULTs are procured to enable
simultaneous testing on multiple stations (one TPS per station able to support these
UUTs), the fraction of failures of the 1'h UUT that could not be repaired due to downed
station capability is represented by k(l - x/n1 ).
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c. Example Computations
Table VIII shows example X's for three UUTs and the status of four
CASS configurations used to test them. Shaded blocks represent lack of repair capability
for a particular UUT as determined by the SSM mapping model. For example, station
B is intended to have the capability to repair UUT 2 and 3 but not 1. 'Up' and 'down'
indicate the actual functional status of the capability within a station at the time of the
snapshot. For example, station C has a 'down' status for repair of UUT 1 caused
(perhaps) by a failed circuit card that has not yet been removed and replaced. Given this
information, A, and AM are computed as follows:
Table VIII. Example 'Snapshot' Data for Computing AP and AM
UUT Sta A Sta B Sta C Sta D X ,/
1 UP DOWN UP .002 2/3= .6667
2 UP DOWN .005 1/2 =.5000
3 DOWN UP DOWN DOWN .003 1/4 = .2500
(Shaded blocks indicate no repair capability)
A, = .002 (.6667) + .005 (.5000) + .003 (.2500) = .4583
.002 + .005 + .003
AM, using method 1, is
AM = min {.6667, .5000, .2500) = .2500.
UUT 3 has the minimum value of x,/N and is thus the most critical one identified by this
method.
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AM, using method 2, is
AM = max 1.002(1 - .6667), .005(1 - .5000), .003(1 - .2500))
= max .6667, 2.500, 2.250)) = 2.500.
UUT 2 has the maximum value and is thus the most critical one identified by this
method.
2. Measures of Effectiveness for Planning Purposes
a. Average Availability (A,,,)
The proposed MOE for planning such as workload analysis and sparing




A1j = Operational availability of the capability to
repair UUT, on CASS stationr;
MTBFj = Mean time between failure of the repair capability
for UUT, on CASS stations;
MDTIj = Mean downtime for the specific functional
capability to repair UUT, on CASS stations;
Next, define a matrix,
B = [b],
where
b= Aj if CASS station, is supposed to have capability
(determined by the mapping model) to repair UUT,;
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bij = 0 otherwise.
and another matrix M,
M W,
where
= if CASS station1 is supposed to have capability to
repair UUT;
= 0 otherwise.
The demand weighted average availability is then:
A k MI'
where
X = A vector of k values;
X B I = The weighted sum of the kAij's for all UUTs and CASS stations;
X M I = The sum of Xmj for all UUTs and CASS stations.
b. Example Computations
Table IX shows the three UUTs and four CASS stations presented above
with values of Aj for the capability to repair UUT, using CASS stationj. Given the values
of availability for each repair capability, the site-wide average availability (A,,,) is
computed. Note also that average availability can be computed for an individual CASS
station and for an individual UUT repair capability (across the CASS stations).
Site-wide average availability is:
Av = L.002 (.74 + .81 + .70)1+[.005 (.77 + .65)1+[.003 (.67 + .75 + .69)1 = .72.
(.002 * 3) + (.005 * 2) + (.003 * 3)
89
Table IX. Example Data for Computing Average Availabilty (A.,,)
UUT Sta A Sta B Sta C Sta D
1 .74 .81 .70 .002
2 .77 .65 .005
3 .67 .75 .69 .003
(Shaded blocks indicate no repair capability)
UUT average availabilities are:
AuuT = .74 +.81 +.70 =.75;
3
AuT2= .77 + .65 = .7 1;
2
AUT3= .67 + .75 +.69 = .70.
3
CASS station average availabilities are:
ACASS A = (.002 * .74) + (.003 * .67) =.70;
.002 +.003
AASB= (.005 * .77) +(.003 * .75) =.76;
.005 +.003
AASc= (.002 * .81) + (.003 * .69) =.74;
.002 +.003




The second criteria for evaluating CASS in comparison to existing ATE systems is
its ability to accept emerging testing requirements without the need for major hardware
and software changes. This expandability has become a critical requirement for CASS
as a result of quantum leaps in the technology used in weapon systems now under
development which have resulted in new frequencies, power levels and functional
parameters that exceed current testing capabilities. Advanced technologies which CASS
must support in the future include: [Ref. 13:p. 5-11]
" Digital technology using very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC).
" Advanced electro-optic systems such as high energy CO2 lasers and focal plane
array technology.
" Millimeter wave technology for electronic warfare systems using very high
frequencies.
* Advanced radar and data transmission systems using spread spectrum technology
to achieve high frequencies and bandwiths.
* Fiber-optics interface systems that will replace existing data transmission cables.
Past ATE systems have not been able to expand to keep pace with changes in
technology. The result has been obsolescence cycles of seven to fourteen years. The
FOT was created to reduce the proliferation of testers, yet the inflexibility of these
systems to accept new technology has resulted in the continued need for peculiar support
equipment. The Navy ATE inventory today is a mixture of more than 300 PSE testers
and 24 ATE systems. Whenever a new test requirement emerges, weapon system
program managers look at the existing inventory and try to adapt an FOT tester to fit the
need, either through station modifications or development of complex IDs that contain the
missing instruments. If neither of these are feasible, NAVAIR buys another PSE tester.
[Ref. 9]
A 1987 cost-benefit analysis conducted for NAVAIR by Prospective Computer
Analysts (PCA) estimated the extent and cost of FOT modifications needed to
accommodate projected requirements through the year 2010. It ideatified seven members
of the FOT capable of receiving new instrumentation to provide the needed capabilities
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and eliminate most PSE. These include HTS, CAT lID, RADCOM, RADCOM-Radar
Interface Unit (RIU), EWTS, TMV and IMUTS II. The existing electro-optics tester
cannot be modified to accept the new requirements and a new one will be needed. The
conclusions of this study were that development and procurement costs of this
9augmented' FOT far exceeded the costs of CASS (to be discussed further in the next
section) even though the FOT systems chosen are mature and would require only
replacement of instruments. They would also require considerably more facility space;
an average carrier would require 34 augmented FOT (AFOT) stations compared to 19
CASS stations. [Ref. l:p. 5-5]
There are many factors which limit the growth capability of commercial test
equipment (CTE) based testers. Among the most serious constraints are:
[Ref. 55]
" Space: New instruments must fit physically into existing racks.
" Heat: New instruments must not exceed the existing air conditioning capacity of
facilities.
* Speed: New instruments may drive changes in the ATE operating system, test
executive or application software.
* Calibration: New instruments must not exceed existing calibration accuracy.
CASS must overcome these problems to achieve its goal of a 20-year life cycle and
a halt in the proliferation of PSE. The CASS approach to these goals is termed "flexible
and open-ended architecture" centering around the functions-on-a-circuit-card described
in Chapter III. This approach is intended to enable adding functions to meet new testing
requirements simply by inserting an additional card or replacing an existing one. Because
CASS separates the hardware from the application software with intermediate
microprocessor asset controllers, functions may change or move around within the tester
without impact on the TPS and station computer software. Any change requires only a
new address within the asset controller software. Functional assets may also be combined
by the asset controllers to create large functional test suites of stimulus and response
capabilities required for complex testing strategies. [Ref. 28:p. 2]
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Armed for the first time with a test system capable of low cost expansion to meet
new technologies, NAVAIR has established the policy that CASS will always be modified
in response to emerging requirements rather than acquiring PSE. At least thirty months
before a new testing capability is needed in the fleet, NAVAIR (AIR-552) will match the
attributes of CASS to the technical test requirements of the new weapon system using the
SSM mapping model. If the'requirement cannot be matched to an existing CASS
functional asset, one of two actions will be taken. If the test requirement falls within the
scope of the CASS performance specification, an engineering change proposal (ECP) will
be initiated using support equipment procurement funds. If the requirement falls outside
the CASS scope, a change will be initiated under the preplanned product improvement
(V3 I) program using R&D funds.
As site-specific testing requirements and workload change over time with the phase-
in and phase-out of weapon systems, CASS stations will not only be modified to meet
new functional requirements but will be reconfigured to maintain an optimal workload.
For example, if a site has three hybrid testers and one EO tester and additional EO testing
requirements emerges, one of the three hybrid testers could be reconfigured into a second
EO tester by adding the needed circuit cards, EO rack and ancillary equipment. The new
EO tester would be technically able to support the new requirement plus the full set of
UUTs previously supported by the hybrid tester. [Ref. 2 8 :p. 4] Through these
approaches, CASS should hopefully be able to meet the challenge of new technology and
remain the Navy's standard general purpose tester.
E. ATE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COSTS
The final criterion for evaluating CASS is the extent to which it reduces ATE
system life cycle costs. For this criterion CASS must be compared, not to existing
systems, but to an Augmented Family of Testers which is the only feasible alternative to
CASS for the expected twenty year life of the program.
Table X presents the conclusions of the 1987 PCA cost-benefit analysis. [Ref. 1 :p.
1-3] They determined that the 20 year costs of procuring an augmented FOT of eight
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testers, matched instrument-by-instrument to current CASS testing capabilities, would
exceed the costs of CASS by $2,022 million.
Table X. 1987 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Procurement of CASS versus AFOT
Cost Catagory Augmented FOT CASS
ATE Development 227 164
ATE Production 3,777 1,178
TPS Procurement 8,291 9,202
Storage/Transport 367 96
Total 662 10640
(Costs are in $ Millions)
This study ignored support costs, and considered only the costs of development and
production of ATE stations and TPS plus storage and transportation during phase-in. It
also computed relative cost, schedule and performance risks for each alternative, which
it found to be roughly equivalent. Its most significant assumptions were:
• ATE station costs: CASS development and production costs are based on the FSED
contract price. AFOT development and production costs are based on vendor
catalogue costs for CTE and complexity factors and standard engineering labor hour
costs for CDE.
* TPS procurement: Costs per UUT are equivalent for CASS and AFOT. Total
CASS TPS costs exceed those of AFOT by $911 million due solely to the costs of
transitioning existing testers to CASS.
" Workload analysis: The number of CASS stations required was based on the rough
estimates computed by NAVAIR early in the full scale development phase. The
number of AFOT stations was based on the current throughput and UUT load of
the seven testers that would be augmented, assuming a proportional increase in
stations required to support the added workload of UUTs from off-loaded testers
and new weapon systems.
* Costs are computed in 1987 dollars with no discounting of future dollars to present
values.
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The overall effect of these assumptions is an underestimation of the cost advantages
of CASS. TPS development and production costs for CASS will almost certainly be less
than for development of the same TPS for augmented versions of existing testers because
CASS will require fewer complex and costly IDs than would the less flexible augmented
FOT. CASS TPS development tools (discussed in Chapter III) also offer cost advantages.
NAVAIR has not quantified the resulting reduction in TPS development costs but
considers it to be significant. The study also ignored the significant advantages of CASS
compared to the FOT in such areas as TAT, supportability, flexibility, TPS
transportability, and expandability, and assumed that a tester matched functionally to
CASS is equivalent in performance. This if not a valid assumption, and results in further
underestimation of the benefit/cost ratio of CASS. [Ref. 56]
NAVAIR also conducted a cost benefit analysis of CASS that includes many of the
operation and support costs neglected in the PCA study. Table XI compares the February
1990 NAVAIR estimates of the 20 year life cycle costs of CASS versus a "future" FOT
and PSE combination. [Ref. 57] This analysis estimated CASS life cycle costs
to be $8,069 million less than the alternative.
Table XI. 1990 Life Cycle Cost Comparison for CASS versus a Future FOT
Cost Catagory Future FOT CASS
ATE Development 653 180




(Costs are m $ Minions)
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These estimates are in undiscounted 1989 dollars, and include all operation and
support costs except manpower. The expected costs of CASS PI are also included. They
do not, however, include the costs of TPS.
The 1987 PCA study estimated CASS development and production costs to be
$2,662 million cheaper than AFOT, while the 1990 NAVAIR study estimated these CASS
costs to be $7,613 million cheaper than a future FOT. The differences in their
conclusions are due primarily to different assumptions regarding hardware requirements
for the non-CASS alternative. Both analyses, however, agree that CASS is the cheaper
alternative by a significant margin.
Because CASS is also cheaper in TPS and operation and support costs, it is clearly
the least cost alternative for satisfying NAVAIR automatic testing needs throughout its
life cycle.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
CASS will enter operational service in fleet AIMDs beginning in mid-1993. This
thesis attempted to answer the questions most in the minds of fleet users who will have
to live with CASS, for better or worse. Will it solve the host of ATE problems that
currently plague the fleet? What is NAVAIR's strategy for solving them, and how does
it differ from past strategies? Will CASS make a difference in terms of weapon system
support?
To lay the groundwork for answering the research questions, the thesis introduced
ATE by describing its place in the Naval avionics maintenance concept, ATE maintenance
facilites and architecture. It then summarized ATE evolution to show the problems and
initiatives that led up to CASS. It next described the CASS program goals, system,
acquisition strategy and introduction plan. Because achieving these goals and solving
current A'I E problems are rooted in the avionics repair process, the thesis described this
process and its relationship to weapon system support and spares allowances. Finally, the
thesis evaluated CASS in comparison to the existing family of testers using three criteria:
throughput, expandability and test equipment life cycle cost.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The primary conclusion of this analysis is that CASS is technically capable of
achieving its program objectives and solving or alleviating virtually every significant
problem faced by AIMDs in operating and supporting the current family of ATE. Its
objectives are first, to improve throughput 100% in order to improve weapon system
operational availability, readiness and capability to meet combat sortie requirements; and
second, to standardize ATE hardware, software and support in order to reduce the cost
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of ownership of both avionic systems and support equipment. These objectives address
the most significant ATE problems facing the fleet today: those related to ATE
supportability and its affects on weapon system readiness and support costs.
The CASS acquisition strategy, support philosophy and equipment design are
significant improvements over those of most existing ATE systems in terms of
supportability and life cycle costs. CASS is a model development program in many
respects. However, there are still many areas of risk remaining in the program. CASS'
success in the fleet is critically dependent on decisions that will be made during TPS
development and introduction planning. The areas of risk with the most damaging
consequences are:
" Funding shortfalls for CASS station procurement or TPS development which may
disrupt the sequence of introductions and transitions, result in less than optimal
profiles of quantities versus configurations of CASS stations delivered to individual
sites, result in less than optimal TPS fault isolation or maintainability performance,
and lead ultimately to greater weapon system life cycle support costs. Slippages
in the introduction and transition schedule are likely to result in increased interim
support costs and cause a ripple effect in other programs. A one year slip in F-14D
TPS development, for example, would increase F-14D support costs by
approximately $30 million and disrupt the carrier transition schedule.
* Inaccurate workload analysis of site-specific station requirements. If this analysis
results in delivery of too few CASS stations it may, like funding shortfalls, lead to
weapon system supportability problems and higher than optimal weapon system
support costs.
The following paragraphs summarize the conclusions of the study in greater detail
with regard to the three evaluation criteria.
1. Throughput
As a result of a number of attributes, CASS is likely to substantially improve
throughput in comparison to existing testers. CASS attributes which favorably influence
throughput include use of a functional test strategy, expanded computer capabilities, and
improved supportability. Use of a functional test strategy is likely to reduce TAT. BCM
rate and cost of weapon system spares for at least some UUTs, especially for newer
weapon systems having extensive BIT capability.
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Advances in computer capabilities between the family of testers (FOT) and
CASS may significantly reduce the relative time required for several testing and
management functions. These capabilities include expanded computer processing power,
which allows both faster testing and simultaneous performance of multiple tasks, and
management tools such as the Operational Management System (OMS) and Intermediate
Maintenance Operations Management System (IMOMS). Coupled with the
transportability of many weapon system TPS between different CASS configurations,
these management tools offer the capability to efficiently and flexibly manage a network
of CASS stations. This flexible network is a key to minimizing backlog and improving
weapon system support because it enables the CASS testing load to be evenly distributed
across many avionics shops. Existing ATE systems have little such flexibility and
redundant testing capability. As a result, they commonly build up backlog during periods
of increased operating tempo or even due to random variations in induction rates.
Improvements in CASS supportability will work to increase throughput in two
primary ways. First, better self-testability and maintainability will reduce elapsed
maintenance time (EMT) because less time will be lost troubleshooting station and TPS
faults during on-line UUT testing and repair. TPS maintainability is UUT specific,
however, so it is still an unknown element (although NAVAIR has established tentative
guidelines for TPS development which would lead to satisfactory levels of
maintainability). It is a function primarily of the comprehensiveness of TPS self-testing
capability (which improves maintainability) and the amount of active circuitry they
contain (which reduces it). Because TPS maintainability affects throughput and weapon
system spares costs, TPS development should seek an optimum (least total weapon system
support cost) tradeoff between total TPS costs and total spares costs. This tradeoff must
also be considered in any decision to develop active interconnection devices rather than
modify the CASS stations to attain the capability to support new technology.
The second way that CASS supportability can increase throughput is by
improving CASS station operational availability. The analysis did not provide an
unequivocal answer on whether CASS will have a higher level of availability, however.
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It is likely that CASS stations will be far more maintainable (measured by mean time to
repair) than many existing testers such as RADCOM and CAT ID because CASS
minimizes the use of commercial test equipment and provides extensive self-testability,
modularity and improved operator support aids such as an automatic technical information
system (ATI) and embedded training. CASS may be less reliable than these same testers,
at least upon initial fleet introduction, if its comparatively low mean time between failure
assumptions are accurate. Its reliability is likely to grow during operational service,
however, and should eventually match or exceed the reliability of existing testers. The
CASS requirement for a portable chiller for station cooling may negatively impact its
reliability.
The most significant factor affecting ATE operational availability is mean
logistics delay time (MLDT). The conclusion of this analysis is that CASS will
substantially improve MLDT in comparison to existing testers because it will have an
organic repair capability and all logistic support will be delivered up front and tested
during OPEVAL rather than phased in. Because of this, CASS operational availability
will likely be higher than that of existing testers.
Given a particular value for CASS operational availability and the EMT of
each UUT, workload analysis facilitates additional tradeoff decisions to achieve the
optimal total weapon system support cost. Attaining the CASS program goal of a 100%
increase in throughput may not be desirable because throughput is intimately related to
many factors, including the number and cost of stations at a site, the cost of CASS SRA
sparing, the cost of weapon system sparing and the cost of TPS procurement. The CASS
System Synthesis Model (SSM) is under development to enable consideration of at least
some of these many complex relationships in calculating optimal combinations of CASS
stations at each site. Its use is hampered at the present stage of introduction planning,
however, by the lack of solid data on TPS EMT, difficulty in calculating a value for
CASS availability that accounts for partially capable stations and the interactive effects
of redundant testers at a site, and the SSM's lack of a queuing simulation model for
workload analysis. The linear programming model currently used in the place of such a
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simulation model is far less accurate and could lead to substantial errors in site planning,
as has occurred in past ATE programs using such a model, and could result in many of
the negative consequences highlighted at the start of this section. Operational testing of
CASS and CASS TPSs will substantially reduce the risk in measuring these input
parameters and is critical to the program's success.
2. Expandability
Expandability to accept emerging testing requirements is a critical requirement
for CASS to be able meet the challenge of new technology and remain the Navy's
standard tester throughout its intended 20 year life. The conclusion of this thesis is that
CASS is clearly far more able than existing testers to keep pace with changes in
technology. It achieves this expandability because it separates the hardware from the
software and because of its flexible 'function-on-a-card' approach that enables functions
to be added by inserting new cards or replacing existing cards. Rather than procuring a
new tester, as has often been done in the past when a new testing requirement emerged,
NAVAIR can initiate a change to the CASS station using the engineering change proposal
(ECP) or preplanned product improvement (131) processes. CASS stations can also be
reconfigured from one functional type of station into another as site-specific testing
requirements and workload change over time. These capabilities of functional expansion
and reconfigurability should enable each AIMD site to maintain an optimal set of testers
to minimize the total weapon system life cycle cost.
3. ATE Life Cycle Cost
Two studies were reviewed which showed that CASS has substantially lower
20-year life cycle costs than an upgraded FOT. A 1987 cost benefit analysis performed
by Perspective Computer Analysts (PCA) compared CASS to an 'augmented' family of
testers (AFOT) composed of seven existing testers plus a new electro-optical (EO) tester.
These eight testers would take over virtually all avionics testing from the other common
ATE and peculiar support equipment (PSE) and meet new technology requirements
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envisioned through the year 2011. The study found the cost of developing and producing
such an AFOT would exceed the costs of CASS by $2,022 million. The study included
the costs of TPS procurement, and found that CASS TPS would exceed the cost of the
AFOT TPS by $911 million as a result of the requirement to transition many existing TPS
to CASS support. The study assumed individual new CASS TPS development costs
would be similar to typical costs for current TPS, which is probably an invalid assumption
since CASS is intended to have less complex interconnection devices. As a result, new
CASS TPS are likely to be substantially cheaper than would TPS for an AFOT (rather
than more expensive as the PCA study concluded). The study did not consider operation
and support costs.
The second cost benefit analysis, performed by NAVAIR, included operation
and support costs (except manpower) but not TPS costs. It found CASS development and
production costs to be $7,613 million cheaper than a 'future' FOT, and total 20-year life
cycle costs to be $8,069 million cheaper than the alternative. Although the conclusions
of the two studies differ in many cost categories as a result of differing assumptions, both
agree that CASS is the cheaper alternative by a significant margin.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made based on the above conclusions:
1. NAVAIR should continue to fund the CASS program at 100% of requirements to
maintain the emerging introduction and transition schedule and the optimal
(minimum weapon system support cost) level of TPS performance. The
introduction plan should be developed and justified through rigorous economic
cost analysis. Efforts to reduce current outlays by slipping the schedule or
reducing TPS performance will most likely lead to far greater expenditures in the
out years.
2. Expedite completion of development of a queuing simulation and integrate it into
the System Synthesis Model (SSM) for determination of CASS station
quantities/configurations to be delivered to each site. Expand the model (perhaps
by modifying the existing linear programming portion of the workload model) to
consider the full range of inter-related factors that should be traded off to optimize
weapon system support costs at each site. Additional factors not presently
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included in the SSM include the costs of procuring and holding weapon system
spares, the costs of procuring multiple TPS for high failure rate UUTs, the costs
of CASS spares and their effects on CASS availability, measures of CASS
availability that account for partial capability and the interactive effects of
redundant stations, variations in UUT inductions and the effects of multiple server
queuing on EMT and TAT.
D. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
The thesis proposed new methods for calculating CASS availability for management
control and introduction planning. Additional research is needed, ideally by the Naval
Air Engineering Center since they maintain the SSM, to validate the usefulness of these
measures for solving some of the current problems involved in using measures of CASS
operational availability (A.) for sparing and workload analysis. If these measures are
found to be useful, research is also needed to validate the ability of the IMOMS/OMS
systems to collect the necessary data. If their ability is found to be inadequate, these
systems should be modified.
A
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APPENDIX A: CASS INTRODUCTION AND TRANSITION SCHEDULE
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1990-1999
This appendix presents the current schedule for introduction of new weapons
systems to CASS support and transition of existing ATE systems to CASS. It is taken
from a May 1990 unpublished draft version of the CASS Introduction Plan prepared by
the Naval Air Engineering Center for NAVAIR. [Ref. 57] Weapon and test systems are
listed in alphabetical order. The shaded areas represent periods of interim support
required prior to availability of CASS stations and TPS to support a particular weapon
system. Split bars indicate a period of dual CASS and interim support. Various notations
indicate the type of weapon system interim support that is planned, such as contractor
warrantees, commercial factory test equipment (FTE) or 'repair of repairables' (ROR),
organic depot support, existing PSE testers or existing ATE systems such as the
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